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MODIFYING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN *
Abstract: This Article addresses the problem of “mid-term” modification of
employment—the common employer practice of introducing adverse changes
in incumbent employees’ terms of employment on penalty of termination. It
calls for a universal reasonable notice rule under which courts would enforce
mid-term modifications only where the worker received reasonable advance
notice of the change. An employer’s sudden imposition of new terms prevents
employees from exercising what is often their only form of bargaining power
—the ability to credibly threaten departure. Rejecting retrograde judicial approaches that turn on the presence or absence of consideration, the Article argues for a “procedural good faith” rule that directly polices the risk of coercion consistent with contemporary contract modification law. Courts should
enforce mid-term modifications only where the employer provides enough
advance notice to allow the employee time not only to meaningfully consider
the proposed change, but also to compare and secure alternate work.
[E]very social structure . . . has a fundamental problem with conflicting
1
needs for certainty and for flexibility.

—Ian R. Macneil
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INTRODUCTION
Long-term employment relationships are constantly in flux. Worker responsibilities, terms of compensation, job titles, company policies, employer-provided benefits, and a variety of other conditions of work are routinely
altered over the course of what is often a multi-year, highly dynamic professional and personal relationship. In cases involving at-will employment—
the vast majority of such relationships—the economic realities and power
dynamics are such that changes in terms are likely to be introduced unilaterally by the employer for purposes of advancing its own business interests. 2 The worker is often presented with a set of non-negotiable terms, less
favorable than the ones ostensibly governing the parties, and asked to accept on the implicit or explicit threat of termination.3
The contractual enforceability of these “mid-term modifications,” 4 as
this Article refers to them, has significant ramifications for the economic
2
The author has described this problem previously in the context of employer-imposed arbitration and noncompete agreements, both of which require the employee to give up critical background rights to the advantage of the employer. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap
Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
637 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts] (arguing against court enforcement of delayed term, or “cubewrap,” employment contracts). This Article considers the enforcement of these documents under somewhat different circumstances and in relation to judicial treatment of other types of employer-initiated changes in terms, most notably the unilateral modification of employee handbooks and personnel policies. See infra notes 42–133 and accompanying
text.
3
To be sure, not all changes in terms will be adverse to the employee. In the context of employee handbooks, for instance, an employer may choose to augment or enhance existing benefits
and compensation policies in the interest of maintaining employee morale, improving retention,
and positioning itself as an employer of choice in the market for quality employees. See, e.g.,
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1263–64 (N.J.) (noting in a dispute over
contractual enforceability of a handbook termination policy that past modifications of the handbook had almost always favored employees), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). In such contexts, however, one can assume that the employee is amenable to the change. This Article focuses
on adverse changes where the quality of employee assent is likely to be in question.
4
In adopting this term, this Article means to distinguish between true modifications—
situations in which employers genuinely decide to adopt new terms and polices during the course
of an ongoing relationship—and the human resources practice of providing “new” terms upon the
commencement of work that were not revealed at the time the offer of employment was extended
and accepted. Elsewhere this author has described the latter type of agreement as a “cubewrap”
contract and argued that such agreements should be categorically unenforceable in situations
where the employer could have provided the terms in advance. See generally Rachel ArnowRichman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman,
Worker Mobility] (arguing courts should not enforce “cubewrap” noncompete agreements provided upon or shortly after commencement of employment); Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts,
supra note 2 (defining and arguing against the enforcement of cubewrap noncompete and arbitration agreements). In the literature of restrictive covenants, a noncompete signed subsequent to the
start of employment has also been referred to as an “afterthought” agreement. See Jordan Leibman
& Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed
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success of corporate actors and the livelihood and wellbeing of individual
workers. Employees want to be able to rely on consistent compensation and
benefits. Employers genuinely require flexibility to deal with changes in
personnel matters and external economic circumstances. Despite this, the
common law has developed neither a coherent legal framework for analyzing mid-term modifications, nor a theoretical basis for understanding existing doctrine.
Judicial treatment of mid-term modification controversies reveals two
broad categories of approaches. Under what this Article calls the “unilateral
modification” approach, 5 courts typically permit employers to change terms
at their discretion. 6 These courts theorize that because at-will employment
may be terminated at any time, continued employment constitutes consideration for any changed terms the employer might chose to impose. 7 In contrast, some courts follow what this Article calls the “formal modification”
approach. 8 These courts require the employer to provide an additional benefit beyond continued employment—such as a raise, bonus, or other employAfter At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The “Afterthought” Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1465, 1523–28 (1987). The use of that term, however, does not distinguish between terms that
genuinely arise during the course of employment and those that could have been provided in advance of hire. This Article considers only the former.
5
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Employment Law Inside Out: Using the Problem Method to
Teach Workplace Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 44–46 (2013) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Inside Out] (adopting this terminology).
6
See, e.g., Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78-79 (Cal. 2000) (holding that notice plus
offer of continued employment constituted consideration for modification of job security policy
six years after its promulgation); Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058, 1063
& n.3 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (holding continued employment to be sufficient consideration for a
noncompete signed two years after the start of employment); Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847
N.E.2d 99, 109 (Ill. 2006) (holding continued employment to be sufficient consideration for an
arbitration program added one year after the start of employment); infra notes 42–133 and accompanying text.
7
See, e.g., Asmus, 99 P.2d at 78; Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063; Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109; infra
notes 42–133 and accompanying text. There are a number of important variations on this approach
that this Article distinguishes infra notes 42–133 and accompanying text. In the noncompete context, for instance, a handful of courts require that the employer actually retain the employee for an
unspecified amount of time, as opposed to offering a mere promise of continued employment. See,
e.g., McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“We also hold that
continued employment for a substantial period is sufficient consideration to support the employment agreement.”). More importantly, in the context of handbook modification, some courts have
required the employer to provide reasonable notice of the unilateral modification. See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 78 (Cal. 2000) (“The general rule governing the proper termination of unilateral
contracts is that once the promisor determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or modify the contract, and provides employees with reasonable notice of the change, additional consideration is not required.”); infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. This Article argues that the
latter approach should be adopt as the universal rule for determining the enforceability of midterm modifications, at least in those situations in which the relationship remains at will. See infra
notes 215–295 and accompanying text.
8
See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 47.
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er promise—in recognition of the fact that the employer remains free to
terminate the employee at will subsequent to the changed terms. 9 Under this
view, the mere promise of continued at-will employment is illusory and
cannot supply the requisite consideration for a change in contract terms. 10
This Article problematizes the assumptions underlying both approaches. First, it argues that the unilateral and formal modification approaches
give undue attention to consideration in determining the enforceability of
contractual modifications. Contemporary modification doctrine has systematically moved away from the historical inquiry into consideration in favor
of an approach grounded in fairness and voluntariness. 11 Courts’ use of consideration as the touchstone for enforcement reflects a retrograde understanding of modification law that aims to satisfy formalistic rules of contract formation at the expense of assessing the legitimacy of the employee’s
assent to modification. In reality, at-will employees have no “choice” in
consenting to mid-term modifications, irrespective of whether they receive
“new” or “separate” consideration in supposed exchange for the new terms.
Second, the Article argues that neither the unilateral nor formal modification approach properly balances the competing policy goals that animate
contemporary modification law. The historical rationale for a strict new
consideration requirement in determining the enforceability of a modifica-

9

See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
to modify a handbook “[s]eparate consideration, beyond continued employment, is necessary”);
J.M. Davidson, Inc., v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. 2003) (holding, in context of arbitration agreement signed by incumbent employee, “[a]t-will employment does not preclude formation of other contracts between employer and employee, so long as neither party relies on continued employment as consideration for the contract”); Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d
791, 796 (Wash. 2004) (holding that “independent consideration is required at the time promises
are made for a noncompete agreement when employment has already commenced”); infra notes
42–133 and accompanying text.
10
In the particular situation of changes to prior policies that allegedly altered the employee’s
at-will status, courts have put forth a different but related analysis, namely, that because the employer has lost its right to freely to terminate the relationship, its continuation of the employee’s
employment cannot serve as consideration for new terms. See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1145
(“[C]ontinued employment alone is not sufficient consideration to support a modification to an
implied-in-fact contract. Any other result brings us to an absurdity: the employer’s threat to breach
its promise of job security provides consideration for its rescission of that promise.” (emphasis
omitted)). As discussed infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text, this is essentially an application of the traditional common law pre-existing legal duty rule.
11
The culmination of this trend is the Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) adoption of a
good faith modification rule, which explicitly rejects the common law’s pre-existing legal duty
rule and the requirement of “new” consideration to support a modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1)
(AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 2015) (“An
agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.”); id.
§ 2-209 cmt. 2 (“[M]odifications made [under subsection (1)] must meet the test of good faith
imposed by this Act.”); infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text.
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tion was to protect against possible coercion. 12 The flip side of that concern
is the need for flexibility, particularly in long-term relationships where market circumstances and the needs of the parties will likely change over
time. 13 Commercial law’s rejection of the consideration rule reflected a desire to better balance these goals, requiring a good faith showing of the need
for the modification and making the inquiry into coercion direct and explicit. 14 Mid-term modification law, however, with its continued focus on consideration, prioritizes flexibility. Under the unilateral modification rule, employers have free reign to change terms of employment at any time, regardless of their content or the quality of employee assent, whereas under the
formal modification rule, employers need only implement their preferred
terms contemporaneous with a modest pro-employee adjustment, which
often is itself tied to continued employment. 15
Instead, this Article advocates for a universal reasonable notice rule in
assessing the enforceability of mid-term modifications. 16 Drawing on case
law developments in the handbook modification context, 17 the Article proposes that mid-term modifications unilaterally imposed by employers in atwill relationships should be enforceable only where the employer provides
reasonable advance notice of the change. 18 Reasonable notice would mean
12
See 2-7 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (2015), LexisNexis (attributing
the rule to “tough cases in which one contracting party has been subjected to a holdup game, so
that the promisor [agreed to the modification] under some degree of economic duress”); infra
notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
13
See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 900–01 (1978).
14
See U.C.C. § 2-209(1); infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text.
15
Formal modification courts typically recite that additional consideration can take the form
of a promised promotion, raise, or other benefit, disregarding the role of employment at will. See,
e.g., Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794 (“Independent consideration may include increased wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or perhaps access to protected information.”); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (“The separate consideration
. . . would include promotion, pay raise, [or] special training . . . .”). At one point, Texas law
seemingly required that a valid consideration have value independent of continued employment.
See Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 646–48 (Tex. 1994) (construing employer’s reciprocal promise to provide initial training as forming an immediately binding bilateral
contract and distinguishing situations in which provision of training or confidential information
was subject to continued employment); see also Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the
21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 739–42 (2006) (discussing the wisdom of Texas’ historical approach). The Texas Supreme Court, however, has since
retreated from this approach. See Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d
644, 650-51 (Tex. 2006) (enforcing noncompete signed after the start of employment based on
employer’s promise to provide confidential information over the course of employee’s continued
at-will employment despite illusory nature of employer’s promise where such information was in
fact provided resulting in a binding unilateral contract).
16
See infra notes 213–295 and accompanying text.
17
See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71; infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text.

432

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 57:427

an amount of time necessary for the employee to assess the significance of
the change and consider alternatives, in particular the possibility of finding
alternate employment. 19 Such an approach is more consistent with mainstream contract doctrine, lends greater clarity and predictability to existing
law, and better balances the competing policy goals of flexibility and fairness for both parties.
A few disclaimers are in order. First, there are reasons to question
whether, as a matter of policy or supervening law, certain substantive terms
of employment should be deemed unenforceable irrespective of when or
how an employee agrees to them. For instance, commentators have long
expressed concern that noncompetes may unfairly constrain workers’ ability
to earn a living, 20 and recent research has suggested that such agreements
may suppress innovation and impede economic growth. 21 This Article does
not engage those questions, taking the majority rule enforcing reasonable
noncompetes as a given. 22 It does, however, recognize and endorse the various jurisdiction-specific limitations that constrain enforceability in particu-

19
In making these assertions this Article parts company with the recent Restatement of Employment Law, which ostensibly endorses a reasonable notice approach to handbook modifications. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An employer may prospectively modify or revoke its binding policy statements if it provides reasonable advance notice
of, or reasonably makes accessible, the modified statement or revocation to the affected employees.”). In contrast to the Restatement, this Article advocates for an expansive understanding of
reasonable notice, sufficient to enable the employee to conceivably find replacement work. See,
e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71 (upholding modification of employee handbook where plaintiffemployees had six months’ advance notice of the disputed modification). In addition, this Article
limits the rule to situations involving at-will employees, recognizing a distinction where the employee was previously promised long-term job security. The Article expands on these points in
juxtaposition to the Restatement’s position in greater detail infra notes 215–262 and accompanying text.
20
See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652–
53 (1960) (explaining that covenants not to compete have the effect of reducing a person’s value
in the competitive marketplace, and are neither efficient nor fair, because the cost to employees
bears no relation to the risk of injury to employers and often overprotects employers).
21
See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 34–35 (2013) (rejecting “orthodox” view that noncompetes are
necessary to incent investments in workers and developing a “dynamic” model in which employee
mobility creates positive externalities that inure to the benefit of all employers); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999) (suggesting that the growth of
Silicon Valley may owe in part to the mobility of its workforce and consequent knowledge spillovers enabled by California’s ban on employee noncompetes).
22
The key exception is California, which refuses to enforce employee noncompetition agreements. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West 2008); see also HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 480-4(d) (LexisNexis 2015) (“[I]t shall be prohibited to include a noncompete clause or a nonsolicit clause in any employment contract relating to an employee of a technology business.”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006) (voiding employee noncompetition agreements).
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lar circumstances. 23 The arguments advanced in this Article, precluding enforcement of mid-term modifications absent reasonable notice, would operate in addition to, not instead of, those rules. 24
Second, this Article accepts the regime of employment at will which
permits either party to terminate the employment relationship for any or no
reason and recognizes that many employees lack the ability to bargain for
particular terms of employment. 25 It seeks neither to dismantle the dominant
rule nor correct for employees’ limited bargaining power. 26 Rather the Arti23

Most jurisdictions require employers to demonstrate a “legitimate” or “protectable” interest
in trade secrets, confidential information, or customer relations as a threshold to enforcement, and
then limit enforcement to that which is reasonably necessary to safeguard the interest asserted. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise to
refrain from competition . . . is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than
is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by
the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.”).
24
The same is true with respect to the various judicially-imposed limitations on the substantive terms of employee arbitration agreements grounded in the unconscionability doctrine. See,
e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693–94 (Cal. 2000) (finding
unconscionable an arbitration agreement that limited recovery of a successful employee to back
pay yet preserved the employer’s right to file claims against employees in court); see also David
Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13, 19 (2011) (describing how
unconscionability has become such a critical tool in invalidating arbitration agreements as to appear “less like a traditional contract defense and more like a specialized anti-arbitration measure”).
Many of these limitations appear to survive the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011), which struck down the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s application of California’s unconscionability rule precluding class
action waivers in arbitration agreements as inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally Jerett Yan, Note, A Lunatic’s Guide to Suing for $30: Class Action Arbitration, the Federal
Arbitration Act and Unconscionability After AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 551 (2011) (concluding that courts have read Concepcion narrowly as precluding only a per se
ban on class action waivers, leaving intact the fact-intensive unconscionability analysis that courts
had applied to arbitration agreements generally).
25
The employment at will rule has at times been articulated as permitting parties to terminate
without notice, as well as without reason. The author contends in a prior Article that this formulation is incorrect and that employment at will does not defeat the general contract rule that parties
to an agreement of indefinite duration must provide reasonable notice of termination. See Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1582–83 (2014) [hereinafter ArnowRichman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law]. The proposal advanced in this Article
could rest on that same premise. That is, if employers must provide reasonable notice of termination, they must similarly provide reasonable notice of changes in terms. This Article, however,
independently justifies the adoption of a reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifications so
that neither a court nor the reader need accept the conclusions of the author’s earlier work.
26
A large body of scholarship has criticized employment at will from various ideological and
methodological perspectives and argues in favor of a rule constraining employers’ ability to terminate without cause. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967)
(arguing for additional limits on an employer’s right to discharge employees); Cynthia L. Estlund,
How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6
(2002) (asserting that a default rule allowing discharge only for cause and requiring employees to
waive their “right to for-cause protection” would bring the law in line with employees’ expecta-
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cle aims to leverage existing contract doctrine and its underlying justifications to enable employees to exercise the limited bargaining power they
have. The result is not a level playing field, but one on which employees are
better positioned to play according to (and perhaps despite) the governing
rules.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem of midterm modification of at-will employment terms and the incoherence in existing law. 27 It examines three recurring situations—the unilateral imposition of covenants-not-to-compete, arbitration agreements, and employee
handbook modifications subsequent to the start of employment. Part II turns
to the law of contract modification outside the employment context, exposing how principles of voluntariness and good faith have informed contemporary doctrine. 28 Part III explores how the principles underlying mainstream contract modification law might inform courts’ treatment of midterm modifications of employment at will, proposing a reasonable notice
rule that would grant employees sufficient opportunity to consider proposed
changes in terms and seek alternate employment. 29 Part IV considers possi-

tions); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89
(2008) (pointing to patchwork nature of current laws and regulations relating to termination as
justification for policy change); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631 (1988) (arguing employers should have to present a plausible reason for
termination); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996) (proposing federal wrongful
discharge statute); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change
in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979) (arguing just-cause termination rule should replace at-will
employment); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1987)
(discussing policy arguments justifying increased restrictions on employers’ ability to dismiss
employees); Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62 (2008) (proposing “compromise” statute between
just-cause termination and at-will employment); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates:
Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988) (discussing
debate over wrongful dismissal and employment at will); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will
in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000) (outlining history of at-will employment doctrine in American law); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the
Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002) (arguing for an information forcing just cause “default rule”). Elsewhere, the author engages this scholarship, concluding that employees would be
better served by a statutory rule requiring advance notice or severance pay rather than just cause.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause to Just Notice in Reforming Employment Termination Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 296,
324–25 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just
Cause to Just Notice]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment At Will,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 72 (2010). For purposes of this Article, however, the author accepts employment at will and its existing just-cause-based exceptions as the governing legal framework.
27
See infra notes 34–139 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 144–212 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text.
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ble obstacles to implementing a reasonable notice rule and the inherent limits of the approach. 30
I. CHANGED TERMS OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
Mid-term modification is a recurring and pervasive problem that affects a variety of substantive employment terms and implicates several different bodies of employment law. This Part provides an overview of the
mid-term modification problem, beginning in section A with a definition of
mid-term modification that distinguishes these legally significant and adverse changes in terms from other informal adjustments in workplace relationships. 31 Section B examines how courts have approached mid-term
modifications across three common scenarios—the unilateral imposition of
covenants-not-to-compete, arbitration agreements, and employee handbook
modifications subsequent to the start of employment. 32 Section C considers
possible doctrinal and policy explanations for courts’ inconsistent approaches to mid-term modifications, concluding that courts have failed to
justify their disparate approaches to enforcement. 33
A. The Mid-Term Modification Problem in Employment Law
Delineating the problem of employment contract modifications requires some initial understanding of what constitutes an employment contract, itself a tenuous thing. Most workers lack a formal written contract
purporting to define all of the initial terms of the engagement. 34 Rather, the
terms of their agreement are likely found in multiple documents and, perhaps more importantly, in oral statements and tacit understandings. 35 For
those employees that do have formal written agreements, they are likely to
be “incomplete.” 36 It is impossible to imagine a contract that sets out all of
30

See infra notes 300–388 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text.
32
See infra notes 42–133 and accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
34
Common exceptions include written contracts for executive or other high-level employees
and collective bargaining agreements for unionized employees.
35
See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Foreword: The Role of Contract in the Modern
Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman,
Foreword] (describing the “multiple sources of obligation and expectation” in workplace relationships).
36
An incomplete contract is one containing “gaps,” that is, areas in which the parties’ writing
fails to define their rights and obligations. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 399 & n.25. There is a rich
literature addressing why such gaps exist and how courts should fill them. See, e.g., Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ben-Shahar, supra; Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2014); Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law31
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the terms and expectations of what is likely to be an evolving and potentially long-term work relationship. Even if it could be done at the outset, it
would likely change over time.
The “relational” nature of employment is thus the reason why rules of
modification are both necessary and elusive. 37 Currently, both workers and
employers operate in a state of perpetual uncertainty as to which promises
are contractually binding, which reflect extra-contractual norms, and which
are mere aspirations, not rising to the level of a promise at all. 38 The inevitable disputes take various forms. Frequently, an employee asserts that he or
she was contractually promised some form of job security or a specific term
or benefit of employment. The employer may respond that the particular
promise was not made, was not contractual, or, if it was contractual, that the
particular promise was revised or retracted. In another class of disputes, it is
the employer who seeks to enforce an allegedly binding promise of the em-

suit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2009); Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What to Do when
Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
323; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of SelfEnforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003).
37
The term “relational contract” is often used to describe long-term contracts between parties
whose behavior and expectations regarding contract performance and termination are heavily
influenced by their extra-contractual understandings, which may not be reflected in the letter of
their agreement. On the general subject of relational contract theory, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 737 (2000); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U.
L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]. For a consideration of the problems
posed by changes in circumstances and contract modification within relational contracts, see Macneil, supra note 13. For articles applying relational contract theory to the specific context of employment, see Robert Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149
(2005); Paul J. Gudel, Essay, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF.
L. REV. 763 (1998).
38
See Arnow-Richman, Foreword, supra note 35, at 2–3. As the author has previously explained,
Given the multiple sources of obligation and expectation in the workplace, it is often
difficult to determine what should happen in the event of a dispute. Which of the
parties’ promises are gratuitous and which carry the force of law? . . . [S]ome workplace “promises” are not even statements, but are simply implicit in the parties’ understanding of how things work between them.
Id. Some commentators use the term “social contract” or “psychological contract” to describe the
extra-contractual expectations of employers and employees. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo et al.,
Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 462 (2011); Denise M.
Rousseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations, 2 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 121,
123 (1989); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 550 (2001).
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ployee, such as a promise not to compete or to arbitrate any disputes, made
at or after the start of employment.
No single theory of employment contracts can resolve all of these disputes. It makes sense, however, to treat at least a subset of them uniformly,
at least where the factual context suggests that contract modification rules
should apply. This would include all situations where the employer, acting
as the drafting party, explicitly alters previously governing terms during the
course of the employment relationship with the intention that the new terms
are themselves contractually binding—what this Article calls “mid-term
modifications.”
Several recurring fact scenarios fall within this frame. First, an employer may ask an incumbent employee to sign a contractual document relinquishing pre-existing background rights. Where an employer imposes a
noncompete, for instance, it requires the employee to give up his or her default right to compete post-employment. 39 Similarly, where the employer
imposes an arbitration agreement, it requires the employee to forego his or
her right to litigate disputes in court in favor of the private process selected
by the employer. 40 Second, employers may make changes to their own internal policies that eliminate previously conferred contractual benefits. If
the employment relationship is governed by a contractually binding personnel policy or employee handbook, the employer’s alteration of those documents in ways adverse to the employee has the effect of extinguishing previously held contractual rights.
All of these scenarios are distinguishable from the informal “changes”
in employment “terms”—staffing decisions, work instructions, personnel
actions, etc.—that parties likely anticipate as part of the natural ebb and
flow of a dynamic work relationship. In contrast, a mid-term modification
39
A noncompete, in effect, extends the employee’s tort duty of loyalty, which otherwise endures only as long as the employment relationship continues and specifically preserves the employee’s right to prepare to compete post-departure. See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771
P.2d 486, 498 (Colo. 1989) (applying the planning and preparations exception to the duty of loyalty); Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 479–81 (Mo. 2005) (same); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (“Throughout the duration of an agency relationship . . . . an agent may take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prepare for competition following
termination of the agency relationship.”).
40
This includes statutorily conferred rights, such as the right to a jury trial in pursuing antidiscrimination claims. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived”
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383 (1996) (asserting that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements “permits the relegation of public-law statutory
discrimination issues to a forum in which the advantages of judicial review and the relative competence of judges presiding over public trials can be discarded in favor of a procedurally defective
private forum”); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Private Resolution of Public Disputes: Employment,
Arbitration, and the Statutory Cause of Action, 32 PACE L. REV. 114, 129–31 (2012) (suggesting
that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements inappropriately subjugates statutory regulation of the employment relationship to principles of private contract).
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(1) is implemented through a formal writing; (2) alters an established and
enforceable term of the relationship; 41 (3) inures to the detriment of the employee; and (4) is implemented by the employer with the intent that it will
be prospectively binding. Given the commonalities in form and effect, it
makes sense to conceptualize these changes as a distinct problem and apply
a common doctrinal framework in assessing their enforceability. As the next
section explains, however, courts have not taken a uniform approach to
mid-term modifications.
B. Mid-Term Modifications and the Appeal to Consideration
Employment law currently does not conceive of mid-term modifications as a distinct doctrinal problem. Rather, courts respond contextually to
the recurring factual scenarios described above. The jurisprudence, however, reveals a common doctrinal split. In all three contexts, courts divide over
whether the employer must provide “additional” consideration for the
change in terms. Some courts find a binding modification in the employer’s
mere retention of the employee, yet others require an additional benefit to
the worker to as a quid-pro-quo for the adverse modification.
This section describes these two approaches—what this Article refers
to as the “unilateral modification” approach and the “formal modification”
approach—as well as some of the permutations that courts apply in particular factual scenarios. 42 As this section demonstrates, courts widely favor
unilateral modification when analyzing mid-term noncompete agreements, 43
whereas in the arbitration context they are more likely to demand separate
consideration in the form of a reciprocal promise to arbitrate. 44 In the handbook context, the law is more contested. 45 The balance appears to be in favor of unilateral modification, but only where the employer has supplied
reasonable notice of the change, 46 and the dissenting view in favor of formal modification has been cogently articulated. 47

41

In this context, “enforceable” means a term that either derives from background common
law or statutory law or that has been conferred contractually, as through a binding personnel manual.
42
See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 44–46 (adopting this terminology).
43
See, e.g., Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063; infra notes 48–75 and accompanying text.
44
See, e.g., Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 503, 507–08
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013); infra notes 76–103 and accompanying text.
45
See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
46
See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 78; infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
47
See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1153–60 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.

2016]

Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts

439

1. Covenants-Not-to-Compete: Continued Employment as Consideration
The most developed jurisprudence on the enforceability of mid-term
modifications is found in the context of noncompetes. 48 Unlike arbitration
agreements and employee handbooks, noncompetes have been used by employers for centuries, and the law dates back just as far. 49 Most jurisdictions
have addressed the question whether mid-term noncompetes are enforceable
and under what conditions, and the law is relatively settled. The majority of
courts have adopted a unilateral modification approach under which employers may introduce mid-term noncompetes as a condition of continued
employment. 50
Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, a 2011 decision from the
Colorado Supreme Court, provides an example. 51 In that case, the defendant-employee was a mid-level manager who had been hired to help the
company expand its urban-centered operations into outlying mountain regions. 52 Two years into the relationship, the employer asked the defendant
to sign a one-year noncompete. 53 The employee obliged, but quit the fol48

See Lord, supra note 15, at 729 (“Virtually all of the reported decisions concerned with the
enforceability of promises in an at-will relationship involve disputes regarding the enforceability
of restrictive covenants.”).
49
See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 [350]; see also Daniel P.
O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee Covenant Not to Compete Cases,
65 SMU L. REV. 145, 179–82 (discussing sixteenth-century English law’s rejection of noncompetes and subsequent development of the rule of reason); Stone, supra note 38, at 594–95 (discussing eighteenth-century English courts’ scrutiny of noncompetes in order to protect the guild
system).
50
Several articles have explored under what circumstances noncompetes introduced post-hire
should be considered enforceable given the at-will nature of employment. See Leibman & Nathan,
supra note 4, at 1572–73 (arguing for creation of wrongful discharge statute that would make
termination for refusal to sign “afterthought” noncompete actionable and require employer to
provide written notice of employee’s wrongful discharge rights upon introducing agreement);
Lord, supra note 15, at 761–67 (demonstrating that the various judicial rationales for enforcing
post-hire noncompetes are theoretically flawed and that courts are effectively enforcing such
agreements absent consideration); Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95,
118 (1998) (concluding that noncompetes entered into on threat of termination should be unenforceable absent a reciprocal employer promise to terminate only for just cause). The author’s
work in this vein has focused on the particular problem of noncompetes introduced on the day the
employee begins work or shortly thereafter, a scenario that raises the additional concern that the
employer may have acted strategically in delaying delivery of the noncompete terms until after the
employee accepted the job. See Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 966–67; Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 638–41. The following section draws on all
of these works.
51
255 P.3d 1058.
52
Id. at 1060.
53
Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, No. 2004-cv-160, 2007 WL 5333883, at *3
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 224 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2009), rev’d,
255 P.3d 1068.
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lowing year to accept a position with a competitor. 54 In the subsequent suit
by the employer for breach of the parties’ agreement, the employee contended that the contract was not validly formed because he had not received
anything in return for his commitment. 55 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the employer had a legal right to terminate the employee at the time that it proposed the noncompete. 56 Consequently, its offer to retain the employee in exchange for his promise constituted a forbearance of the employer’s legal right to terminate, creating a
sufficient consideration for the agreement. 57
The unilateral modification approach applied in Lucht’s is appealing
from both an administrative and doctrinal perspective. It is easy to apply
and it is technically correct under the prevailing interpretation of employment at will. If one accepts the premise that employers can terminate at any
time for any or no reason, it follows that they may change terms at any time
and for any or no reason. 58 Each moment of the relationship is a new
agreement to continue employment on whatever new terms the parties

54

Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1060.
Id.
56
Id. at 1061 (“In the context of employment, an employer has a legal right to terminate an atwill employee at any time because employment at will is a continuing contract between an employer and an employee that is terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee.”).
57
Id. at 1062–63; see also, e.g., Perma-Liner Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Sewer & Drain, Inc., 630
F. Supp. 2d 516, 522–23 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Lowry Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Head, 984 F. Supp. 1111,
1115 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Digitel Corp. v. Deltacom, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Ala.
1996); Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 315 F. Supp. 704, 713 (M.D. Ga. 1970); Mattison v. Johnston,
730 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301,
1305 (Del. Ch. 1983); Ins. Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 191–92 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986);
Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 1995); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 657 P.2d 589, 591–92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Cent. Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram Assocs., 622
S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Cellular One, Inc. v. Boyd, 653 So.2d 30, 34 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar, 464 A.2d 1104,
1106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Raines v. Bottrell Ins. Agency, Inc., 992 So.2d 642, 646 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008); Comp. Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 451–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Sec. Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 106 N.W.2d 456, 462–63 (Neb. 1960); Camco, Inc. v. Baker,
936 P.2d 829, 831–32 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d
1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977); Lake Land Emp’t Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ohio
2004); Cent. Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); Summits 7, Inc. v.
Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 372 (Vt. 2005); Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922,
926 (Va. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Home Paramount Pest Control Co. v. Shaffer, 718
S.E.2d 762, 766 (Va. 2011).
58
As noted previously, the author rejects this premise in an earlier work, arguing that employment at will is subject to the general contract rule that parties to an agreement of indefinite
duration must provide reasonable notice of termination. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming
Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1580–83. The point, however, is that if one accedes
to the dominant understanding, a unilateral modification rule is the logical corollary.
55
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choose. 59 This is an odd way to look at the employment relationship, a matter to which this Article returns in the next section. 60 For present purposes,
it is enough to observe that the characterization yields dissatisfying results
in the context of a mid-term noncompete. The legal principle underlying
courts’ inquiry into the sufficiency of continued employment is that “new”
consideration is ostensibly required for a contract modification: the party
adversely affected should receive something in exchange for the less favorable terms. 61 If the employer merely continues the employee’s at-will employment, that employee is no better off than before the mid-term modification with respect to compensation, benefits, and job security. Now, however,
he or she is subject to additional—and potentially onerous—obligations
post-employment. 62
For these reasons, some courts have rejected unilateral modification in
favor of a formal modification rule under which employers must provide
consideration additional to continued employment. 63 Labriola v. Pollard
Group, Inc., a 2014 Washington Supreme Court decision, illustrates this
approach. 64 Similar to Lucht’s, it involved an at-will sales employee who
was asked to sign a noncompete several years into his employment. 65 The
court held that, although the agreement would have been enforceable had it
been executed upon hire, 66 an agreement executed post-hire could only be
59

See Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063 (“By virtue of the nature of at-will employment itself, the
presentation of the [noncompete] agreement was an offer to renegotiate the terms of [Defendant]’s
at-will employment, which [Defendant] accepted by continuing to work.”); Columber, 804 N.E.2d
at 32 (“The presentation of a noncompetition agreement by an employer to an at-will employee is,
in effect, a proposal to renegotiate the terms of the parties’ at-will employment.”).
60
See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. The author has discussed this issue elsewhere. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563–
70 (discussing the disconnect between at-will employment and unilateral contract theory).
61
This is essentially a statement of the pre-existing legal duty rule under general contract law,
although courts addressing mid-term modifications do not invoke the doctrine by name. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor
which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”); see infra notes
148–159 and accompanying text. It pertains, however, only where there is a pre-existing “legal
duty” to perform, something that is absent in employment-at-will relationships.
62
See Lord, supra note 15, at 772 & n.149 (citing Columber, 804 N.E.2d at 34 (Resnick, J.,
dissenting)) (“[I]n the end, the employer simply winds up with both the noncompetition agreement
and the continued right to discharge the employee at will, while the employee is left with the same
preexisting ‘nonright’ to be employed for so long as the employer decides not to fire him.”).
63
See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); Poole v.
Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001); Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794–95; Hopper, 861 P.2d at 541.
64
100 P.3d at 794–96.
65
Id. at 792; see Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1060.
66
Oddly, almost every jurisdiction that rejects continued employment as sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete is willing to enforce one entered into at the commencement of atwill employment, notwithstanding the fact that an employer’s promise to hire is equally “illusory.”
See, e.g., Poole, 548 S.E.2d at 209 (“[O]rdinarily employment is . . . sufficient consideration to
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enforced upon a showing of “independent consideration,” such as “increased wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or perhaps access to protected information.” 67 None of these were provided to the
defendant-employee, who experienced no change in status after the noncompete. 68 Thus, the court found no consideration for the agreement and
refused to enjoin the employee’s subsequent competition. 69
It is uncertain whether the formal modification approach actually addresses the problem that inspired it. As Labriola illustrates, some of the
most common forms of additional consideration recognized by formal modification courts, including pay raises and promotions, are themselves dependent on continued employment. 70 It is difficult to explain how such dependent benefits can confer actual value to the employee, constituting valid
consideration, when the underlying promise to continue employment remains discretionary. 71
support a restrictive negative covenant, but where the employment contract is supported by the
purported consideration of continued employment, there is no consideration when the contract
containing the covenant is exacted after several years employment and the employee’s duties and
position are . . . unchanged.”); see Lord, supra note 15, at 715 (discussing this paradox). Only
Texas has rejected the idea that mere at-will employment can constitute consideration for a noncompete under any circumstances, including at the time of hire. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Tex. 2009) (finding enforceable noncompete
entered into at the time of at-will hire based on employer’s implicit promise to provide confidential information which employee in fact received). Thus, whatever the wisdom of hinging nocompete enforceability to the presence of consideration “additional” to at-will employment, Texas law
is at least internally consistent on this point.
67
See Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794.
68
See id. at 795 (“Prior to execution of the 2002 noncompete agreement, Employee was an ‘at
will’ Employee. After Employee executed the noncompete agreement, he still remained an ‘at
will’ employee . . . .”).
69
Id. at 796; see also Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899, 904 (Mont. 2008)
(finding no consideration because employee received no additional benefit in exchange for signing
a noncompete four months into employment); Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 220 S.E.2d
190, 195 (N.C. 1975) (finding no consideration because employee received no additional benefit
in exchange for signing a noncompete after eight-and-a-half years of employment); Socko v. MidAtl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1275–76 (Pa. 2015); Poole, 548 S.E.2d at 209 (finding no
consideration because employee’s “duties, position, and salary were left unchanged”); cf. Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630 (rejecting as consideration indirect benefit that inured to employee as a
corporate shareholder); Hopper, 861 P.2d at 541 (finding sufficient consideration because employee received a pay raise after signing a noncompete while already employed). At least one state
has codified this approach. See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2015) (requiring that a noncompete
must either be presented to the employee in advance of employment or “entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the employer”).
70
See Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794 (citing as examples of additional consideration “increased
wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or . . . access to protected information”).
71
See Lord, supra note 15, at 741 (observing that a “promise of a raise cannot be consideration for an at-will employee's promise not to compete, since the promised raise might never be
given, and the employee could be terminated immediately after signing the covenant”).
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Perhaps for this reason, other courts sympathetic to the position of the
employee have tinkered with the application of the unilateral modification
approach rather than search for some new or additional benefit. Thus some
courts have held that continued employment counts as consideration only if
expressly indicated: either the agreement must recite that the employee’s
promise is in exchange for retaining employment, or the employer must
make clear that absent the employee’s assent he or she will be terminated. 72
Others require that the employer actually retain the employee for an indeterminate period of time. 73 In such jurisdictions, the promise of continued
at-will employment ostensibly constitutes consideration, but enforcement of
the agreement hinges on the degree to which the employee actually benefited from the promise. 74
Whether these tweaks in fact mitigate the harsh effects of a pure unilateral approach, 75 they are the exceptions rather than the rule. In most jurisdictions, continued employment alone is sufficient consideration to support a noncompete agreement added during the course of employment. In
those states, employers may freely introduce noncompetes at any point in
the employment relationship, subject only to the noncompete-specific restrictions imposed by state law on the scope of those agreements. Defenses
to enforcement based on contract formation principles have little traction.
2. Arbitration Agreements: The Reciprocal Promise to Arbitrate
Courts appear more willing to police contract formation in cases involving mid-term arbitration agreements. As in the noncompete context,
some courts find consideration for the change of terms in the employer’s
72

See, e.g., Ackerman, 652 N.E.2d at 509 (finding consideration because employer explicitly
promised continued employment); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding no consideration because employer did not “condition[] employment or promise[] to do
anything in exchange for [the employee] signing the covenant”).
73
See, e.g., Cent. Adjustment Bureau, 622 S.W.2d at 685 (finding consideration where employees received continued employment for “years” after signing noncompete); Brignull, 666
A.2d at 84 (finding consideration where employee received continued employment for three years
after signing noncompete); cf. Diederich Ins. Agency, LLC v. Smith, 952 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (finding insufficient consideration where employee was terminated three months
after signing noncompete).
74
This is arguably the most logically flawed of the various approaches. These courts essentially hold that an illusory promise can be cured by gratuitous post-hoc performance, a concept
anathema to the notion that consideration requires a “bargained for” exchange. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71; see Lord, supra at note 15, at 765 (critiquing such courts for concluding that “what was initially a bad bilateral bargain . . . can become a good unilateral contract”).
75
An approach that enforces mid-term noncompetes only if explicitly agreed to on penalty of
termination creates a perverse incentive for employers to threaten their employees and to follow
through on their threats when their demands are not obliged.
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continued employment of the employee. 76 But in contrast to noncompete
law, courts assessing mid-term arbitration agreements incline toward a formal modification approach, scrutinizing the content of the agreement to determine whether the employer made a reciprocal promise. Absent an employer promise to arbitrate its own claims or otherwise be bound by the policy, many will reject the agreement as unenforceable for lack of consideration despite the promise or presence of continued employment. 77
Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., a 2013 Missouri
Court of Appeals decision, offers an example of this reciprocal promise requirement. 78 In that case the employee served as the defendant-football
team’s controller until he was terminated at age sixty. 79 In his subsequent
age discrimination suit, the employer sought to enforce the arbitration
agreement the employee had signed in the second year of his thirty-eight
year career.80 The Missouri Court of Appeals held the agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration. 81 It found that the employer made no
reciprocal promise to arbitrate, nor any other future promise to the employee in the parties’ agreement. 82 The court concluded that the mere promise of
continued at-will employment could not serve as consideration, reasoning
that absent an express duration or other constraint on the employee’s ability
to terminate “any alleged promise . . . was illusory and invalid.” 83 It reached
this result despite Missouri precedent recognizing continued employment as
76
See, e.g., Tillman v. Macy’s, Inc., 735 F.3d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 2013); Soto v. State Indus.
Prod., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2011); McNamara v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 570 F.3d 950, 956
(8th Cir. 2009); Dantz v. Am. Apple Grp., LLC, 123 F. App’x 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2005); Tinder v.
Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002); Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240,
1260 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Fahim v. CIGNA Inv., Inc., No. 3:98CV232, 1998 WL 1967944, at *3 (D.
Conn. Sept. 10, 1998); Gadsden Budweiser Distrib. Co., Inc., v. Holland, 807 So.2d 528, 531
(Ala. 2001); Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109; see also Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in
Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 456–57 (2006) (discussing court decisions finding continued employment sufficient consideration for arbitration agreement).
77
See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 F. App’x 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2005); Caley v.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1376 (11th Cir. 2005); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d
Cir. 2002); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. App’x 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2003); O’Neil v. Hilton
Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 1997); Tinder, 305 F.3d at 736; Clemmons, 397 S.W.3d
at 507; Toney v. EQT Corp., No. 13-1101, 2014 WL 2681091, at *3 (W. Va. June 13, 2014);
Harmon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 270, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); see also Bales, supra
note 76, at 453–55 (discussing court decisions requiring some form of reciprocal promise by the
employer for enforceable arbitration agreement).
78
397 S.W.3d 503.
79
Id. at 505.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 507–08.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 507 (explaining that “[t]he Chiefs could have fired Clemmons fifteen minutes after he
signed the Agreement without suffering any legal consequences because his employment remained at-will”).
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consideration in the noncompete context, which it neither referenced nor
distinguished. 84
Clemmons offers a straightforward example of the application of the
formal modification rule in a state that applies the unilateral approach to
noncompetes. Clemmons is factually unique, however. Few arbitration agreements lack a reciprocal employer promise of some sort. An employer’s
agreement to be bound to its chosen form of dispute resolution sacrifices
little, 85 while providing a form of return consideration distinct from continued employment that can ensure enforceability in the face of uncertain
law. 86 For this reason, a number of decisions enforcing mid-term arbitration
agreements do so on the basis of the employer’s reciprocal promise without
addressing the significance of continued employment at will. 87 Others hold
that both continued employment and the employer’s reciprocal promise
84
See JumboSack Corp. v. Buyck, 407 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Collins, 723
S.W.2d at 452; Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, 690 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985). The Clemmons court also rejected the argument that Clemmons’s subsequent employment
made up for this failure by noting, “A contract cannot be formed in retrospect.” 397 S.W.3d at
507. That argument—however flawed in its logic—has been accepted by several courts, including
in Missouri, in the context of mid-term noncompetes. See supra notes 48–75 and accompanying
text.
85
The stakes for employers are especially low if the employer carves out any claims for
which it might pursue emergency injunctive relief, such as misappropriation of trade secrets or
breach of a restrictive covenant. Courts have split on whether an arbitration agreement that excepts the most common, and arguably the most critical, employer claims is so one-sided as to be
unconscionable. Compare Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1173–74 (S.D. Cal.
2011) (finding an arbitration agreement carve-out exempting restrictive covenant, intellectual
property, and other claims was lacking mutuality and thus unconscionable as such claims were
more likely to be brought by the employer than the employee), and Colvin v. NASDAQ OMX
Grp., Inc., No. 15-cv-02078-EMC, 2015 WL 6735292, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2015) (finding
similar carve-out for intellectual property claims unconscionable), with Kepas v. eBay, 412 F.
App’x 40, 48 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding a similar carve-out was sufficiently bilateral and not unconscionable because such claims were likely to be brought by both the employer and employee
since the employer was a “technology company”), and Caley, 428 F.3d at 1378 (holding that although the carve-out exempted likely claims by the employer and covered likely claims by the
employee, it nevertheless was not unconscionable because mutuality of remedy is not required
under Georgia law), and Fuqua v. SVOX AG, 13 N.E.3d 68, 82 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014) (holding arbitration agreement carve-out for restrictive covenants was enforceable and not unconscionable
where the employee successfully negotiated for a reciprocal carve-out).
86
See DAVID S. BAFFA ET AL., SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYERS CONSIDERING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS WITH CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS 7 (2013), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/GuidanceMandatoryArbitration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN9J-LJGT] (recommending that employer policies contain, in addition to a
reciprocal promise, “processes that place limits on the timing and method for modifying the arbitration agreement” to avoid illusory consideration problems). See generally Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Claims, 223 EMP. L. COUNSELOR 1 (2009) (calling attention to extent uncertainty over existence of sufficient consideration for post-hire arbitration agreements).
87
See, e.g., Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006); Batory, 124
F. App’x 530; Caley, 428 F.3d 1359; Najd, 294 F.3d 104; O’Neil, 115 F.3d 272; Snow v. BE & K
Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Me. 2001).
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constitute the requisite consideration. 88 Such decisions reveal a preference
for the formal modification approach, but are sufficiently ambiguous as to
leave open the possibility that the court would opt for a unilateral approach
in the absence of a reciprocal promise.
On the other hand, for some courts even a reciprocal promise is not
enough to support a mid-term arbitration agreement. Some refuse to find
consideration where the employer makes a reciprocal promise, but retains
the right to modify the arbitration policy. 89 Piano v. Premier Distributing
Co., a 2004 New Mexico Court of Appeals decision, illustrates the distinction. 90 There the employer adopted an arbitration agreement during the
course of the employee’s employment, which provided that the employer
was similarly bound to the process and could not change it absent a signed
writing by the company owner. 91 The court refused to enforce the agreement for lack of consideration. It held that neither the employer’s promise
of continued employment nor its promise to abide by the policy constituted
consideration for the modification.92 Regarding the former, the court held that
at-will employment could not constitute consideration because it “placed no
constraints on Defendant's future conduct,” leaving retention of the employee
entirely within the company’s discretion.93 Regarding the latter, it held that

88

See Brondyke v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (S.D. Iowa 2013)
(holding that the employee’s “continued employment and the parties’ mutual promise to resolve
their disputes in binding arbitration constitute consideration”); Nuzzi v. Coachmen Indus., Inc.,
No. 3:09-CV-116, 2009 WL 3851364, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2009) (deciding that the employer “allowing plaintiff to continue to work for them constituted adequate consideration” and
“that the employer is willing to give up its own legal right to defend itself in court, and submit its
defense to arbitration, constitutes consideration”); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891,
895 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (concluding that “both the plaintiffs’ continued employment and the parties’ mutual promises to be bound by the Program serve as adequate consideration to make an
enforceable contract” (emphasis added)); cf. Soto, 642 F.3d at 73–74 (holding that continued employment was sufficient consideration, and finding that there was mutual obligation because the
arbitration agreement would only stand if both parties stipulated to it).
89
Snow, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15 (holding that the employer’s unilateral authority to modify
the arbitration agreement made its promise to arbitrate insufficient, illusory consideration); Piano
v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 16 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Harmon, 697 N.E.2d at 272
(holding that no consideration was given to the employee for agreeing to arbitrate where the employer reserved the right to amend or terminate the program at any time and because employees
were at will). See generally Michael L. DeMichele & Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification
Provisions in Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63, 69–74
(2006) (discussing some courts’ refusal to enforce arbitration agreements when employers reserve
right to modify).
90
107 P.3d 11.
91
Id. at 13.
92
Id. at 14–16.
93
Id. at 14.
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the employer’s ability to unilaterally modify the agreement without need for
employee approval rendered its promise to arbitrate equally illusory. 94
To be sure, there are some courts that apply a unilateral modification
rule to mid-term arbitration agreements, consistent with the majority approach to midterm noncompetes. 95 But for others, a different set of rules
appears to be afoot, 96 and few courts acknowledge, let alone defend, the
distinction. 97 One explanation for closer scrutiny of arbitration agreements
94
Id. at 16; see Bales, supra note 76 at 455–57 (describing how courts have found at-will
employment insufficiently binding on employers to be consideration). But see Blair, 283 F.3d at
604 (deciding that consideration existed because employer could unilaterally alter arbitration
agreement only after putting any changes in a writing and submitting them to employee); Sisneros
v. Citadel Broad. Co., 142 P.3d 34, 43 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (finding adequate consideration because the employer could not unilaterally alter or terminate the arbitration policy once employee’s
claims had accrued).
95
Jurisdictions that appear to apply a consistent unilateral rule to both contexts include Illinois, compare Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109 (arbitration agreement), with Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess,
24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994) (noncompete); Michigan, compare Tillman, 735 F.3d at 462
(agreement), with Head, 984 F. Supp. at 1115 (noncompete); and South Dakota, compare
McNamara, 570 F.3d at 956 (arbitration agreement), with Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 518 (S.D. 1996) (noncompete). For a rare example of a court explicitly
relying on noncompete law in the arbitration context, see Dantz, 123 F. App’x at 709 (citing
Columber, 804 N.E.2d at 31–32) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had recognized the sufficiency of continued employment as consideration for a mid-term noncompete in upholding the
disputed arbitration agreement).
96
The following jurisdictions appear to apply a formal modification rule to arbitration agreements yet apply a unilateral modification rule to noncompetes: Washington, D.C., compare Jenkins v. United Healthcare, No. C.A. 7371-99, 2000 WL 298912, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 16,
2000) (finding insufficient consideration for mid-term arbitration agreement despite employer’s
continued employment of employee and mutual agreement to arbitrate), with Ellis v. James V.
Hurson Assocs., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 620 (D.C. 1989) (holding continued employment is sufficient
consideration for a mid-term noncompete where employer actually employs employee for a substantial period); Georgia, compare Caley, 428 F.3d at 1376 (holding employer’s promises to arbitrate its claims and pay costs of arbitration were sufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration
agreement), with Mouldings, 315 F. Supp. at 713 (holding continued employment is sufficient
consideration for a mid-term noncompete); Maine, compare Snow, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15
(holding continued employment was illusory consideration where handbook containing arbitration
agreement was modifiable and disclaimed contractual status), with Brignull, 666 A.2d at 84 (holding continued employment is sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete); Maryland,
compare Mould v. NJG Food Serv. Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679 (D. Md. 2013) (holding continued employment is insufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration agreement and that a mutual promise to arbitrate is required), with Simko, 464 A.2d at 1106 (holding continued employment is sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete); and Missouri, compare Baker, 450
S.W.3d at 777 (holding that neither continued employment nor reciprocal promises to arbitrate
constitute sufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration agreement where employee is at
will), with Collins, 723 S.W.2d at 452 (holding that continued employment is sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete).
97
For a rare but stark example, see Jenkins, 2000 WL 298912, at *1–2 & n.1 (citing Ellis, 565
A.2d 615) (“Although there is case law that permits the court to conclude that continuing employment with a company after receipt of its arbitration policies may constitute a binding agreement, this court concludes that the instant set of facts does not warrant this conclusion.”); cf.
Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 792 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “apply[ing] one rule
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may be the various constraints imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), which limits the grounds on which courts may void arbitration
agreements. Although courts subject noncompetes to state law restrictions
on their scope and effect, they are expressly prohibited from developing any
state-specific enforcement limitations that single out arbitration agreements. 98 This means that courts have no way to police arbitration agreements other than through the identification of contract formation defects.
The more incisive examination of these issues in the arbitration context may
reflect a policy choice by some courts to restrict arbitration through the few
legal tools ostensibly available to them.
Another possibility is that courts choose to rest enforcement on the
employer’s reciprocal promise rather than continued employment in service
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s separability doctrine. Where an arbitration
agreement ostensibly governs the parties’ dispute, the FAA limits judicial
jurisdiction to determining whether the arbitration agreement was validly
formed. 99 In a series of cases, the Court has interpreted this to mean that
courts should decline to rule on challenges to arbitration that rest on the
contractual legitimacy of the parties’ overall contract.100 By focusing on the
reciprocal promise to arbitrate and resisting an assessment of the validity of
continued employment, courts implicitly sever the agreement from the larger relationship for purposes of adjudicating contractual validity. 101
to an employee’s non-compete promises but . . . a different rule if the case involves an employee’s
arbitration promise”).
98
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The Act states,
[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
99
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .”).
100
See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967); see also Stephen J. Ware,
Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV.
L.J. 107, 115–17 (2007) (discussing sources and contours of the doctrine).
101
See, e.g., Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atl., Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 666 (Md. 2003)
(invoking separability doctrine in declining to follow case law recognizing an offer of at-will employment as consideration for an arbitration agreement entered into at the start of employment).
This is not to suggest that the separability doctrine requires this approach. Indeed, the scope (and
wisdom) of the doctrine is subject to significant dispute. See Richard C. Reuben, First Options,
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts
with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 827, 845 (2003) (arguing that “separability
perverts contract law because it assumes away the fundamental principle of contractual consent”
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Alternatively, courts’ reliance on a reciprocal promise may simply be a
means of sidestepping the difficult question of consideration in the context
of at-will employment. If the employer has promised to arbitrate, then the
court need not struggle to reconcile the “illusory” nature of at-will employment with the contractual requirement of a binding exchange.
Either way, it is difficult to square the rejection of continued employment as consideration in the arbitration context with the majority rule accepting it in the noncompete context. From a doctrinal perspective, once the
employee’s assent is established, the question whether the employer provided consideration for the modification is the same. 102 Particularly in those
jurisdictions that adopt the unilateral approach for mid-term noncompetes,
one would expect courts to similarly treat continued employment at will as
sufficient consideration for an employee’s promise to arbitrate. Indeed
courts are precluded from applying contract principles in ways that “disfavor” arbitration agreements. 103 Yet many appear loath to rest enforcement
on continued employment alone. Whatever the reason, when it comes to
arbitration, courts generally hinge their decision on the presence or absence
of a reciprocal promise by the employer and require one that is truly binding.

and “should be repudiated as archaic, unworkable”); Ware, supra note 100, at 121 (arguing that
separability is incompatible with the contractual approach to arbitration, since it separates arbitration law from defenses to enforcement); cf. Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 195–96 (1999)
(arguing that compelling arbitration under the separability doctrine despite allegations of fraud
“would trample the aggrieved party’s freedom of contract”). But see Alan Scott, Everything You
Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 1, 3 (2003) (arguing that despite criticism from respectable academics, separability is “abundantly unproblematic[]”).
102
Mid-term arbitration agreements may take the form of general employer policies, and can
consequently raise assent issues not present in the case of noncompetes, which are always formed
through an individually signed, written agreement. Where, for instance, the employer notifies its
workforce of its arbitration policy through an e-mail or by web posting, treating the employee’s
choice to continue employment as acceptance seems suspect. Courts generally require that, at a
minimum, the employee had actual notice of the arbitration policy for purposes of assent regardless of their position on continued retention of the employee as consideration. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555–59 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that an e-mail
announcing a new arbitration policy did not give the employee sufficient notice for purposes of
assent); Hudyka v. Sunoco, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716–17 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (same); Acher v.
Fujitsu Network Commc’ns, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36–37 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that an
employee did not have notice of an arbitration agreement posted on the employer’s website).
Courts have occasionally imposed a higher threshold for assent akin to a knowing and voluntary
standard. See Bales, supra note 76, at 449–50. It is likely, however, that such an approach violates
the FAA’s interdiction against state law rules that disfavor arbitration. See id. at 450.
103
Concepcion, 536 U.S. at 363–65. At least one dissenting opinion has contended that the
failure to follow state law regarding noncompete formation to arbitration agreements violates the
FAA. See Baker, 450 S.W. at 792 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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3. Employee Handbooks: Unilateral Modification Plus Reasonable Notice
Employee handbooks and personnel policies present a third mid-term
modification scenario, with yet another set of variations. In this context,
courts have similarly split between those permitting unilateral modification
and those requiring formal modification. In contrast to both noncompete
and arbitration law, however, courts applying the unilateral modification
approach to handbook and policy revisions generally require employers to
supply reasonable notice of the proposed change. 104 Thus, handbook law
appears to offer something of a middle way between the approaches reflected in the noncompete and arbitration jurisprudence. 105
Asmus v. Pacific Bell, decided by the California Supreme Court in
2000, is perhaps the definitive case. 106 At issue was Pacific Bell’s discontinuance of its Management Employment Security Policy (“MESP”), which
promised management employees “employment security through reassignment to and retraining for other management positions” in the event of job
elimination. 107 After approximately six years, Pacific Bell replaced its
MESP with a policy designed to decrease managerial staff through severance and benefit incentives. 108 A group of affected managers sued for
breach of contract. 109 The employer conceded for purposes of the litigation
that the original policy was contractually binding and that no material economic event precluded its continued enforcement. 110 The California Su104

See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71.
See Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A “Comparative Conversation” Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 901
(2006) (describing the reasonable notice of handbook modification rule as an “unsurprising . . . inbetween approach” adopted in the face of “conceptual confusion over the appropriate policy and
legal basis for handbook variation”). For other articles discussing courts’ struggle to determine the
appropriate legal standard for enforcing handbook modifications, see W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2003); Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing
Employers from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 799, 804–05 (2003); Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down:
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 CUMB. L.
REV. 375, 375–76 (2002); Bryce Yoder, Note, How Reasonable is “Reasonable”? The Search for
a Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1517–22 (2008). The
following section draws from these works.
106
999 P.2d 71.
107
Id. at 73.
108
Id. at 73–74.
109
Id. at 74.
110
Id. The original policy contained a clause stating that it “will be maintained so long as
there is no change that will materially affect Pacific Bell’s business plan achievement.” Id. at 73.
The fact that the policy contained this express limitation was arguably critical to the resolution of
the case, but was disregarded by the majority based on the stipulations of the parties. See id. at 84–
89 (George, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the MESP was a contract with a fixed duration un105
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preme Court held that Pacific Bell was not required to provide additional
consideration to its workforce in exchange for retracting the MESP other
than continued employment of the affected workers. 111 Rather, the court
concluded that an employer may unilaterally terminate a contractual personnel policy “as long as its action occurs after a reasonable time, and is
subject to prescribed or implied limitations, including reasonable notice.” 112
The court did not expound either on the meaning of “implied limitations” or
what would constitute “reasonable notice.” A vigorous dissent asserted that
formal modification—requiring new consideration from the employer and
actual employee assent—was the proper approach. 113
Of all of the mid-term modification scenarios, it is surprising that
courts would favor unilateral modification in the handbook context given
the nature of the underlying rights. As Asmus illustrates, the terms at issue
in handbook modification disputes generally involve limitations on the employer’s right to terminate. 114 This would appear to do away with the rationale for the unilateral modification approach articulated by courts in the
noncompete and arbitration contexts. If the employer’s original handbook
altered the at-will nature of the relationship, then the employer is no longer
in a position to lawfully terminate the employee and rehire on new terms.
Whereas the employee faced with a mid-term noncompete or arbitration
agreement is at will, the employee in the handbook context is ostensibly
protected by the policy’s original terms. Unilateral modification in this context would appear to be the equivalent of a breach of contract.
Those decisions eschewing unilateral modification in the handbook
context—and most commentators opining on the subject—take this position. 115 For instance, Demasse v. ITT Corp., a 1999 Arizona Supreme Court
decision, involved the retraction of a handbook policy providing that employees would be terminated in reverse order of seniority in the event of a
company layoff. 116 A subsequent version of the handbook eliminated the
der which the employer’s ability to terminate the policy was conditional on its demonstration of a
material change in circumstances).
111
Id. at 81 (majority opinion).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 89–90 (George, C.J., dissenting). The dissent’s primary argument, however, was that
the propriety of the modification should have been determined based on the material alteration
clause contained in the original policy. Id. at 84–89.
114
At least this is true for cases that are litigated. It is easy to imagine disputes arising over
changes in other policies, such as vacation, compensation, and benefits policies. In those situations, the unilateral modification argument, whatever its worth, retains its integrity.
115
For a critique of the unilateral modification plus notice rule and, in particular, the Restatement of Employment Law’s adoption of this position, see Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts:
Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 130–33 (2009).
116
984 P.2d at 1140.
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seniority-based policy and provided that employees would be selected for
layoff based on performance and ability. 117 In a breach of contract claim by
laid-off employees, the Arizona Supreme Court, on certified question from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, concluded that effective
modification requires both employee assent and “separate” consideration. 118
Assent, according to the court, means affirmative steps taken with
knowledge of the proposed change. 119 Separate consideration requires
something beyond mere continued employment. Anything else, reasoned
the court “brings us to an absurdity: the employer’s threat to breach its
promise of job security provides consideration for its rescission of that
promise.” 120
Despite the “absurdity,” the Restatement of Employment Law recently
approved the holding in Asmus, adopting unilateral modification upon reasonable notice as the proper test for determining the enforceability of handbook revisions. 121 Tellingly, the Restatement drafters did not offer a contracts-based rationale for its rule, but rather analogized the promulgation
and alteration of employer policies to the administrative agency rulemaking
process whereby agencies adopt and revise regulations upon notice and
comment. 122
This notion that handbook rights arise outside the traditional contract
framework may explain the reluctance of some courts to apply a formal
modification analysis to revisions. The Supreme Court of Michigan said as
much in addressing the issue in 1987 in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting
Co. 123 In that case, the original manual expressly provided that employees
could be discharged only for cause. 124 A few months before the plaintiff’s
termination, the employer removed the “for cause” phrase from the manual,
substituting a statement that employment was at will. 125 On certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court rejected
the contract-based arguments of both parties, holding that employer policies
117

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142, 1145.
119
Id. at 1145 (“[T]he employee does not manifest consent to an offer modifying an existing
contract without taking affirmative steps, beyond continued performance, to accept.”).
120
Id.; see also Apps, supra note 105, at 893 (“This [unilateral modification] approach has
drastic results for employees . . . as, by refusing to accept the new terms, they are caught between
a metaphorical rock and a hard place. . . . [T]he employment contract practically evaporates.”).
For other decisions rejecting the unilateral modification approach, see Torosyan v. Boehringer
Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995); Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d
1140 (Ill. 2009); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268–69 (Wyo. 1997).
121
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06; Asmus, 999 P.2d 71.
122
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b.
123
443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1987).
124
Id. at 114.
125
Id.
118
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could be revoked unilaterally upon reasonable notice. 126 The court explained its decision by invoking the underlying rationale for judicial recognition of binding employer policies. Such policies are enforceable, according to the court, not as a matter of strict contract law, but because employers
implicitly benefit from the more productive and committed workforce that
good personnel policies occasion. 127 Although employees reasonably expect
employers to abide by their policies while they are in force, they also understand that those policies will change in accordance with the needs of the
business: “The very definition of ‘policy’ negates a legitimate expectation
of permanence.” 128
Even in jurisdictions that purport to treat handbooks as the equivalent
of traditionally formed contracts, a close reading of the cases reveals skepticism about the scope and legitimacy of the employees’ original job security
rights. The litigation posture of handbook modification cases generally presumes both that the employer’s original policy eliminated the right to terminate at will and that it became contractually binding. This was the case in
Demasse, where the Arizona Supreme Court, adopting the formal modification approach, emphasized that its decision was based on the phrasing of the
certified question, which incorporated those premises. 129 The dissent, in
contrast, questioned whether the manual contained binding promises in light
of the employer’s inclusion of a disclaimer 130 and implied that even a con-

126
127

Id. at 121.
Id. at 119. As the court explained,

[A]n employer who chooses to establish desirable personnel policies, such as a discharge-for-cause employment policy, is not seeking to induce each individual employee to show up for work day after day, but rather is seeking to promote an environment conducive to collective productivity. The benefit to the employer of promoting such an environment, rather than the traditional contract-forming mechanisms of mutual assent or individual detrimental reliance, gives rise to a situation
“instinct with an obligation.”
Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980));
see also Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 326, 343 (1993) (“The notion of a bargained-for exchange in this setting is a . . . convenient and understandable [fiction]. These advantages have induced courts to stretch unilateral contract theory in order to achieve a desirable policy result: the enforcement of handbook promises
that benefit employers by creating legitimate expectations among the work force.”).
128
Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
129
Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1148 (“[T]he question certified requires us to assume the handbook
and whatever other dealings may have taken place between ITT and the Demasse employees created a contractual provision that restricted ITT’s ability to discharge.”).
130
The disclaimer was itself added subsequent to the original policy, see id. at 1141, but the
dissents did not address this detail, see id. at 1153–60 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 1160–61(Martone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tractually binding layoff policy could not have altered the employees’ atwill status. 131
Thus, the strongly divergent opinions in the handbook context may
best be explained by different views of the facts rather than the law. Courts
espousing unilateral modification plus notice may be misapplying their rule,
granting summary judgment to employers in situations that call for a factual
inquiry into the job security status of the affected employees.132 This should
not obscure the critical innovation of a reasonable notice requirement as a
supplement to the unilateral modification approach. The additional requirement of reasonable advance notice has the potential to temper the harsh effects of the “pure” unilateral rule frequently applied to noncompetes and at
times to arbitration agreements. Part III will explore this possibility further
in calling for a uniform reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifications of at-will relationships. 133 For now it is sufficient to note that the
handbook cases further muddy the water for any attempt to discern a coherent approach to mid-term modifications.
C. The Law and Policy of Mid-Term Modification Jurisprudence
As the preceding section demonstrates, the law of mid-term modifications is inconsistent at best. There appear to be two basic approaches: unilateral, under which continued employment alone will suffice as consideration; and formal, under which some form of “separate” consideration is required. Courts’ preference for one approach over the other, as well as the
nuances in how those approaches apply, vary by jurisdiction and within jurisdictions across different substantive areas.
It is difficult to explain these deviations from a doctrinal perspective.
Courts analyzing mid-term modifications generally treat employment as a
unilateral contract under which the employer’s offer of employment constitutes an enforceable promise to pay the employee if he or she performs according to the proffered terms. 134 Only one side is bound—the employer—
131

Id. at 1156 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Certainly one can draw a
meaningful distinction between the rights conferred by a seniority-based layoff policy and the
rights conferred by manuals that explicitly or implicitly promise discharge only for cause. Where
employers are free to terminate at will, even if obliged to follow certain protocols in exercising
that right, modifications of their personnel polices should seemingly be analyzed in the same way
that other mid-term agreements are analyzed. This Article revisits this distinction infra notes 316–
344 and accompanying text.
132
This Article returns to this question in greater detail infra notes 372–388 and accompanying text.
133
See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text.
134
See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81 (describing a company’s management security policy as
an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of which was accepted by employees via
their continued employment); Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 96 (“To determine the contents of any par-
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and only if the employee chooses to accept. As will be discussed in Part III,
unilateral contract theory is a poor fit for employment, and bilateral contract
analysis can arguably provide a more accurate and coherent description of
the relationship. But accepting the prevailing framework, courts’ analysis of
mid-term modifications does not follow from their initial premises. If the
employment relationship is a unilateral contract that employees are free to
reject and employers free not to renew at any point, then unilateral modification should be the unequivocal rule for all modifications with the limited
exception of cases in which the at-will relationship has been altered. This
would mean that a pure unilateral approach would apply equally to all noncompete and arbitration modifications, and courts would not need to scrutinize whether a particular arbitration policy included a reciprocal, nonmodifiable promise on the part of the employer. Handbook modification
cases would also follow a pure unilateral modification rule except where the
employer had previously contracted to provide long-term job security, as
opposed to some other type of employment benefit. In those situations,
formal modification would be the rule. Notice would seem to have no place
in the analysis.
The absence of doctrinal consistency would be understandable if
courts’ deviation from general rules of contract law reflected a coherent policy choice. But courts’ consideration of the policy implications of their decisions is both minimal and simplistic. In the noncompete context, for instance, some decisions espousing the minority view in favor of formal modification invoke fairness to the employee as a justification. These courts
point out that an employee who receives nothing other than continued atwill employment in exchange for signing a noncompete has received nothing more than what he or she already had—a job with no secure future.135
ticular implied contract of employment, the factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship must
be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983) (describing employer’s personnel manual as an “offer of a unilateral contract” that the employee accepted through “continued performance of his
duties despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267 (describing an employer’s personnel manual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work when they have no
obligation to continue”); see also 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2 (discussing use of unilateral
contract theory in employment law); Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 551, 559–67 (1983) (discussing employment law’s expansion of unilateral contract theory);
Yoder, supra note 105, at 1523 (discussing courts’ application of unilateral contract analysis to
handbooks).
135
See Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (“A consideration cannot be constituted
out of something that is given and taken in the same breath—of an employment which need not
last longer than the ink is dry upon the signature of the employee . . . .”); Labriola, 100 P.3d at
795 (“Employer did not incur additional duties or obligations from the noncompete agreement.
Prior to [its] execution . . . Employee was an ‘at will’ Employee. After Employee executed the
noncompete agreement, he still remained an ‘at will’ employee . . . .”).
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This is a legitimate critique of the unilateral modification approach, but one
that can equally be levied at the formal modification approach. Requiring
the employer to provide a raise, promotion, or other benefit in addition to
continued employment does not change the employee’s at will status. 136 The
extent to which the employee receives anything of value for the agreement
still rests on the employer’s discretionary decision to continue employment.
On the flip side, those decisions espousing unilateral modification in
the handbook context often invoke employers’ need for flexibility. According to these decisions, employers must maintain freedom to adjust their internal policies in the face of changing market conditions. 137 Such decisions
also note employers’ need for uniformity and the administrative burdens of
a formal modification rule requiring new consideration and individual employee assent. 138 The invocation of these business interests, however, neglects to account for the fact that the employers in such cases elected to
commit to the original policy on which they intended their workforce to
rely. 139 Contract enforcement is about giving effect to the legitimate expectations engendered by voluntary promises. To the extent employers find
themselves hemmed in by their policies or unable to efficiently administer
them, these are problems of their own making. 140
II. CONTRACT MODIFICATION LAW
What the law of employment modification lacks, the law of mainstream contract modification may be able to supply. Contract law under-

136
The author has raised this concern previously in the particular context of handbook modification. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in Its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 143, 155 (2009) (“[H]ow much do workers stand to gain from . . . a rule requiring the
employer to provide separate consideration in addition to . . . notice of a change in handbook
terms? It is easy . . . for the employer to grant the worker an extra vacation day, or some other
peppercorn, in satisfaction of that requirement.”).
137
See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1156 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138
See, e.g., Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 119–20 (“If an employer had amended its handbook from
time to time, . . . the employer could find itself obligated in a variety of different ways to any
number of different employees, depending on the modifications which had been adopted and the
extent of the work force turnover.”).
139
Professor David Slawson has made a related argument that permitting unilateral modification of handbooks deprives employers of the ability to offer contractually binding job security in
situations where they genuinely wish to promote employee retention and possibly avoid unionization. See Slawson, supra note 105, at 31.
140
See id. at 29 (“[A]n employer that finds itself with a confusing mix of unjustifiably different employment [handbook] rights for different employees has only itself to blame. If making
contracts unwisely were a sufficient reason for getting out of them, contracts would be of little
value to anyone.”).
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stands modification as the inevitable result of imperfect prediction. 141 Life
changes. This is the reason that parties contract to begin with: to stake out a
reasonable space of security in the face of an uncertain future—as well as
the reason they may seek to modify those same contracts—as where changes in circumstances reach beyond what was or could have been anticipated
at the outset of their relationship. 142 Thus, the law of contract modification
must strike a balance between parties’ need for certainty and their need for
flexibility. 143
Achieving that balance has been a struggle. Historically courts used
consideration as the touchstone for determining the enforceability of modifications, much as they use that doctrine today in the context of mid-term
modifications of employment. But contract law has long since retreated
from that approach in favor of one that emphasizes fairness and voluntariness. The contemporary rule as to the enforceability of modifications, although still contested in many ways, is ultimately about good faith.144
This Part explores the evolution of the contemporary doctrine of good
faith modification, laying the groundwork for a good faith-based analysis of
mid-term modification of employment relationships. 145 Section A discusses
the traditional common law approach to contract modification under which
enforceability depends on the presence of “new” consideration. 146 Section B
describes the erosion of this rule under the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the contemporary
law’s focus on good faith and voluntariness. 147

141

See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 681 (1982) (“Contracting parties often desire to alter their
agreements in response to changes in circumstances or of mind.”).
142
See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 478 (“At
the most basic level, contract law promises to remedy breaches of contract and provide security of
expectations. It does this only indirectly and imperfectly. It helps reassure us about the stability of
an ever changing and frightening world.”).
143
See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 37, at 362 (discussing the value of peace in
contractual relations because “conflict exists between the need for measurement and specificity,
for precision and focus, and for adherence to planning, and the need for flexibility to meet countless kinds of changed circumstances”).
144
See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) cmt. 2 (“[A]n agreement modifying a sales contract needs no consideration to be binding. However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith
imposed by this Act.”).
145
See infra notes 144–212 and accompanying text.
146
See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
147
See infra notes 165–212 and accompanying text.
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A. The Traditional Approach: Consideration and the Pre-Existing
Legal Duty Rule
Historically, the law of contract modification was the law of preexisting legal duties. That concept embraces the idea that a performance
that a contracting party is already legally obligated to provide cannot constitute consideration. 148 If A is under contract to mow B’s lawn for $25, A’s
promise to mow the lawn cannot support an additional, subsequent promise
from B, such as a promise to pay an additional $5 for the job.149 The effect
of the pre-existing legal duty rule (“PELDR”) is to render modifications to
existing contracts unenforceable absent some new or additional consideration from the party advantaged by the modification.
The intent of the PELDR was to prevent coercion. 150 Where a party is
free to insist on favorable changes in terms post-contract formation, there is
significant risk of overreaching. For instance, B might schedule A to mow
her lawn before an important event, such as an open house for the sale of
her property. When the time for performance arrives, A, knowing B’s situation, could seek to double the agreed-upon price on threat of nonperformance. B, having no time to find a replacement mower, would be
compelled to agree. Strict application of the PEDLR prevents this type of
“hold up game,” rendering B’s reluctant promise of increased compensation
non-binding. 151
Ironically, contract law’s chestnut case evidencing the risk of coercion
and the need for a strict PELDR involved a labor dispute—one in which the
victim, at least as presented in the opinion, was the employer. In Alaska
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, a 1902 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decision, fishermen who had been recruited to work in a remote area
of Alaska during the winter salmon run refused to continue their work with-

148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Performance of a
legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not
consideration.”); see infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text.
149
2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.1. An illustration is instructive:

If A promises to build a house in return for B’s promise to pay a sum of money, this
transaction creates a duty in A. But if, after this transaction has occurred, there is a
subsequent agreement whereby B induces A to build the identical house in return for
a second promise of new compensation, made either by B or by X, the consideration
for this new promise is nothing but the performance by A of A’s already existing duty created by the first transaction.
Id.

150

Id.
Id. (“The [PELDR] had its origins in the striking down of coerced modifications. There
have been tough cases in which one contracting party has been subjected to a holdup game, so that
the promisor made the new promise under some degree of economic duress.”).
151
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out an increase in their base wages. 152 The employer agreed to the increase,
but at the end of the season, refused to pay anything above the original contract wages. 153 Calling it a classic example of the type of strong-armed
modifications the PELDR was designed to prevent, the court held for the
company. 154
Yet strict application of the PELDR will often preclude enforcement of
seemingly legitimate modifications. Returning to the prior hypothetical,
suppose that the morning that A is to mow B’s lawn, the city issues an advisory recommending that all citizens stay indoors due to excessive heat. Well
before the time for performance, A advises B that he is willing to mow her
lawn despite the advisory if she will agree to a modest price increase, and B
gratefully agrees. The modification appears to be fairly reached and reasonable in light of the circumstances, however, it too is likely unenforceable
under a strict reading of the pre-existing legal duty rule. A was already obligated to mow B’s lawn at the original price regardless of the temperature.
A’s recommitment to providing that same service cannot supply consideration for the additional money B has promised to pay.
Not surprisingly, courts have been eager to avoid such results.155 Initially they did so by leveraging legal fictions in the context of seemingly
fair modifications. Under what one might call the “rescission/new contract”
approach, courts concluded that the parties had mutually agreed to forego
their previously existing contract rights and entered into a replacement contract. 156 Under this view, each party agrees (as a theoretical matter) to give
up its rights under the first agreement in exchange for the other party’s release of the same. The parties then agree (again, theoretically) to form a
new agreement under the terms of the modification. Because this contract is
ostensibly formed on fresh ground, the PELDR poses no obstacle to enforcement. 157
152

117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
Id. at 101.
154
Id. at 104. There is of course another version to the story. The fishermen alleged that the
netting and equipment supplied by their employer were of poor quality, reducing their catch and
justifying the increase in their base pay. Id. at 101. The court found it not credible that the employer, which stood to profit from a large catch, would have provided inferior equipment. Id. But
see Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 185, 211–12 (suggesting reasons why the employer might have had an incentive to reduce
volume based on the size of the season’s run and the capacity of its cannery). Had the fishermen’s
version of the facts been credited, it may it may have changed the result—the additional work
necessitated by the poor nets could have been considered an additional detriment to the fishermen,
justifying the increased pay.
155
See Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the U.C.C.: Good Faith
and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 (1979) (describing courts’ resistance to the PELDR which acted as “a roadblock to the free adjustment of contracts”).
156
See id. at 853 (discussing this approach).
157
Id.
153
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Alternatively, under what one might call the “nominal benefit” approach, courts simply found some token additional consideration flowing
from the party seeking the modification to the party accepting it. 158 Thus, in
the price renegotiation between A and B, if A were to promise that, rather
than begin the job at 8:30 a.m., as previously agreed, he will begin fifteen
minutes earlier at 8:15, B’s promise to pay more for the job would become
enforceable. It does not matter that this additional promise is a trifle or that
the primary consideration sought by B’s promise continues to be the mowing service A is already obligated to provide. Because courts do not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration, all that matters is that something new
has been supplied. 159
These early interventions proved problematic. In addition to lacking
intellectually integrity, the approaches failed to achieve the desired result of
policing modifications. The legal fiction of a rescission and new contract
could apply to any situation, including those in which the “agreement” was
procured in hasty or coercive circumstances. 160 As for the nominal benefit
theory, evidence of a trifle consideration arguably does more to suggest
sharp practices than to assuage concerns over whether an agreement had
been fairly modified. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts mitigates this
problem somewhat, providing that an enforceable modification must differ
from the original bargain “in a way which reflects more than a pretense of a
bargain.” 161 Courts have not vigorously enforced this caveat, however, and
the doctrine of “sham” consideration appears to be one with limited bite. 162
A different approach was needed.
158

Id. at 855.
2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.20 (“[I]f the bargained-for performance rendered by the
promisee includes something that is not within the requirements of the promisee’s pre-existing
duty, the law of consideration is satisfied. . . . It is enough that some small additional performance
is bargained for and given.”). The original Restatement of Contracts enabled such results, providing that a modification was enforceable if the return consideration differed in any way from what
was presumed by the original bargain. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1932); see also Hillman, supra note 155, at 854 (describing the theory as “incentive for a promise
to create sham consideration”).
160
See David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 607, 618
(“There are only a couple of problems with the rescission device: It has virtually no basis in reality, and it applies just as logically to a coerced modification as to an innocent one.”).
161
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73.
162
It appears that the sham consideration doctrine has been invoked primarily in situations
where there is a true failure of consideration or a recited consideration is not actually transferred
or agreed upon. See, e.g., Weed v. Weed, 968 A.2d 310, 314 (Vt. 2008) (holding that $10 recited
consideration was not valid where deed was executed prior to receipt and money was not supplied
until lawyer subsequently expressed concern about enforceability). It is unlikely to nullify a modification where there is an actual change in performance, however modest. See Snyder, supra note
160, at 615–16 (expressing doubt whether the sham consideration doctrine can do much to preclude coerced modifications as the doctrine merely asks whether consideration exists and not
159
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B. The Modern Approach: Good Faith and Voluntariness
Over time, the common law retreated further from the PELDR and the
new consideration inquiry. Although concern remained over the risk of coerced modifications, it was clear that the absence of consideration was an
inadequate proxy for the problem. The drafting of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts and the UCC reflected these developments by reframing the
issue more directly around whether a particular modification is fair and fairly reached. Subsection 1 discusses the Restatement’s departure from the
PELDR. 163 Subsection 2 explores the UCC’s rejection of the doctrine. 164
1. The Common Law Unanticipated Circumstances Exception
In the case of the Restatement, the drafters retained the PELDR as a
basic principle, 165 but crafted an exception intended to capture those situations in which a modification is likely to be both fair and voluntary despite
the absence of consideration. 166 Under section 89, a modification of a contract “not fully performed on either side” is enforceable so long as it is “fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when
the contract was made.” 167 The inquiry proposed by the drafters goes in part
to the content of the new bargain: revised terms must be justified by unforeseen circumstances that the parties failed to account for. 168 It also polices
the process by which the modification is reached, albeit indirectly, through
the requirement that the contract be fully executory. The risk of coercion is
strongest where one party has fully performed and the other has not. 169 The
requirement that both sides still hold part of the original consideration ostensibly weeds out the most egregious overreaching scenarios.
Angel v. Murray, a 1974 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, exemplifies the application of the modern rule. 170 There the promisor was a waste
whether it is adequate). For a more thorough discussion of courts’ treatment of nominal consideration and the sham consideration doctrine, see Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1809 (2003).
163
See infra notes 165–177 and accompanying text.
164
See infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text.
165
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73.
166
Id. § 89.
167
Id.
168
See id. § 89 cmt b. This limitation “goes beyond absence of coercion and requires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification.” Id.
169
Completion of construction post-payment is often cited as the paradigmatic scenario. A
builder under contract to erect a house who has not fully completed the project, but has received
all of his or her pay, is in a stronger position to extract a promise of additional compensation in
exchange for completion than the builder who is still awaiting final payment. See Alaska Packers’
Ass’n, 117 F. at 102–03 (discussing this scenario).
170
322 A.2d 630, 636–38 (R.I. 1974).
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collector under a five-year agreement to collect all residential waste in the
city. 171 In the third year of the contract he requested that the city pay him an
additional sum per annum to reflect the fact that unanticipated real estate
growth had led to an increase in the volume of waste to be collected. 172 The
city called a public hearing and agreed to the increase by vote of the city
council. Upon a subsequent challenge to the modification, 173 the court held
that the increased payments were enforceable notwithstanding the fact that
the collector was already under contract to collect all residential waste. 174 It
noted that the modification satisfied all three elements of Restatement section 89: two years of collection services and payment for same were yet to
be rendered, the increase in residential development went beyond that
which had been typical of the community and anticipated at contract formation, and the city agreed to the increase through a fair and open process. 175
The adoption of Restatement section 89 was neither a watershed nor a
panacea. Courts had already been avoiding the PELDR, and it is not clear
that the Restatement had the effect of broadening those rulings. 176 Nor have
courts coalesced around the Restatement’s articulation of the circumstances
justifying an exception, which arguably do a reasonable job of weeding out
coercive modifications, but may not cast the net wide enough in saving legitimate ones. 177 The point, however, is that the Restatement placed an imprimatur on what was a growing trend against formal doctrine. The exceptions had now officially swallowed the rule.

171

Id. at 632.
Id.
173
The challenge was not by the city itself, but was brought by a concerned taxpayer following the city’s expenditure of the additional sums. The fact that the city remained willing to abide,
and indeed did abide, by its modification makes the case unique as an example of voluntariness.
Id.
174
Id. at 637–38.
175
Id.
176
See Snyder, supra note 160, at 619 (concluding that Restatement section 89 does not “advance the doctrine much beyond those cases that would dig into the facts and find consideration
somewhere . . . to support an equitable modification” under the prior law).
177
It is possible, for instance, that a modification may be fair and equitable although it is only
partially executory, as where a significant and unanticipated obstacle to completion of executory
performance is discovered or occurs after the promisee has received full consideration. B’s promise to provide additional compensation to A for mowing her lawn during an excessive heat advisory would be no less equitable if she happened to pay A his fee in advance the day before. See supra notes 148–162 and accompanying text. Similarly, the modification seems fair and equitable
despite the fact that, depending on the season or location, excessive heat could arguably have been
foreseen. For these reasons, it is probably fair to characterize Restatement section 89 as replacing
a technical rule with a technical exception.
172
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2. Good Faith Modifications Under the UCC
The UCC put the final nail in the coffin, rejecting the PELDR altogether for transactions in goods. Section 2-209(1) of the Code states that a
modification of a contract within the Act “needs no consideration to be
binding.” 178 The explicit purpose of the section is to do away with the
common law’s overly technical treatment of modifications and grant parties
greater latitude to adjust their relationship as needed.179 Rather than attempt
to police modifications through consideration or other proxies, the drafters
deferred the problem of potentially coercive modifications to the Code’s
overarching duty of good faith. 180
Good faith has itself been a contested concept in mainstream contract
law. Current article 1 of the UCC defines good faith simply as “honesty in
fact” and “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” 181 The contours of the duty have been framed largely in theoretical
terms. Commentators have debated whether good faith imposes a general
duty—that is, a contractual obligation to avoid any form of “bad faith” behavior 182—or whether good faith merely precludes the use of contractually
reserved discretion to reclaim a foregone benefit. 183 As such descriptions
178

U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
Id. § 2-209(1) cmt. 1 (“This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present
hamper such adjustments.”); see Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285–
86 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing history of section 2-209 and its rejection of the common law);
Hillman, supra note 155, at 856 (same); Snyder, supra note 160, at 622–24.
180
See U.C.C. § 1-304 (“Every contract or duty within [the UCC] imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance and enforcement.”). Commentators have consistently lamented this
indirect appeal to good faith, noting that the standard for fair modifications ought to appear in the
actual text of section 2-209. See Hillman, supra note 155, at 900; Snyder, supra note 160, at 623–
24.
181
U.C.C. § 1-201(20). This adoption represented an expansion from the original definition,
which was limited to subjective honesty alone, except in the case of merchants. U.C.C. §§ 1201(19), 2-103(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAW 2000). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts a similarly, and more explicitly, expansive view of good faith, one that “emphasizes . . . consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party” and excludes conduct that “violate[s] community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a.
182
See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good
Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21, 825–30 (1982). Professor Robert Summers has famously
described good faith as an “excluder,” incapable of specific definition, that prohibits a variety of
behaviors, including evasion and delay, willful underperformance, obstructing performance, and
similar conduct. See Summers, Good Faith, supra, at 201.
183
See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1980). Professor Steven Burton has proposed a narrow
definition of good faith that finds a breach only where a party abuses contractually conferred discretion to recapture opportunities sacrificed at contract formation. See id. For a useful summary of
179
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suggest, questions as to the scope of good faith resonate principally in the
context of disputed performance. The paradigmatic good faith case involves
a party tendering performance that meets the letter of the parties’ agreement
while violating the spirit of their bargain. In such cases, good faith serves as
a tool of contract interpretation.
Modification, on the other hand, presents an issue of contract formation. The question is whether the new terms were fairly obtained and
meaningfully accepted so as to obviate the need for consideration. In this
context, the law reflects the themes of coercion and efficiency that heralded
the abandonment of the common law rule. A modification is deemed enforceable where the party requesting the change acted “consistent with ‘reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing . . .’ and . . . [was] motivated
. . . by an honest desire to compensate for commercial exigencies.” 184 The
two-part inquiry tracks the objective and subjective components of good
faith as defined in UCC article 1. 185 Courts must examine the surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the request for the modification was
both commercially justifiable and honestly obtained.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 1983 decision in
Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. is considered a leading case on
good faith modification. 186 The underlying dispute concerned a year-long
contract for the sale of various types of steel tubing from Sharon Steel to
Roth Steel. 187 Subsequent to the agreement, significant changes in the steel
market dramatically affected the price and availability of the product.188
Sharon unilaterally notified Roth that it would not honor its prices, leading
to protests and negotiation. 189 Roth reluctantly agreed to a price increase
and subsequently tolerated significant delivery delays, assuming they were
the result of raw material shortages and Sharon’s allocation system. 190 It
later discovered that Sharon had prioritized large quantities of tubing for
the dominant theories of good faith, see Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an
Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1025, 1033–49 (2003).
184
Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
185
See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 376–78
(1993) (discussing relationship between the general duty of good faith and its application in the
modification context); Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential Approach to Analyzing
Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. REV. 49, 67–72 (2001) (discussing subjective and objective requirements of good faith for merchants under the UCC).
186
705 F.2d 134.
187
Id. at 137–38.
188
Id. at 138.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 138–39.
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sale to a subsidiary capable of selling the product on the market at higher
prices. 191 Roth sued for breach. 192
Assessing the validity of the modification, the court had no difficulty
concluding that the parties’ price adjustment satisfied the first element of
the test for good faith. “[T]he single most important consideration,” the
court explained, “is whether, because of changes in the market or other unforeseeable conditions, performance of the contract has come to involve a
loss.” 193 The court concluded that the multiple exigencies facing Sharon
Steel would prompt an ordinary merchant to seek a price increase in order
to avoid a loss on the contract. 194
On the second element, however, the court was more opaque. The requirement of “subjective honesty,” it began, means that the modification
“was, in fact, motivated by a legitimate commercial reason and . . . not offered merely as a pretext.” 195 Such language suggests a causal inquiry: the
factfinder should determine whether the market change was the actual reason for the requested modification. The court went on to say, however, that
“the trier of fact must determine whether the means used to obtain the modification are an impermissible attempt to obtain a modification by extortion
or overreaching.” 196 Such language, by contrast, suggests an assessment of
process: a court should determine whether the manner by which the modification was secured created an unfair advantage. 197
Unfortunately, the court’s relatively brief analysis of the second element of the UCC modification test does little to elucidate its meaning. The
facts presented would have supported a conclusion that the modification
lacked good faith from a causal perspective. One could argue that if Sharon
had quantities of tubing earmarked for its subsidiary, then market conditions
were not the direct, or at least not the sole, reason for its price demands and
delivery delays. But the court did not focus on this. Rather it adopted the
district court’s finding that Sharon had “threatened” not to sell steel as obligated by the contract and that “consequently, Sharon acted wrongfully.” 198
In so doing it rejected Sharon’s argument that its unilateral price adjustment
was contractually permissible in the face of industry-wide market conditions, noting that this theory had not been offered at the time modification
191

Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
193
Id. at 147.
194
Id. at 146–47.
195
Id. at 146.
196
Id. (emphasis added).
197
Indeed, the court dropped a footnote likening the inquiry to a procedural unconscionability
analysis. Id. at 146 n.24.
198
Id. at 148.
192
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was sought. 199 Distinguishing cases involving legitimate invocation of contractually reserved discretion, the court held that Sharon had not “rebutted
the inference of bad faith that rises from its coercive conduct.”200 Thus, it
appears the court’s decision was based on the manner in which the modification was obtained: the buyer’s accession to the price increase was a response to threatened non-performance rather than the product of reasoned
negotiation. 201
In this way, the section 2-209 good faith analysis is reminiscent of the
defense of economic duress, which focuses on the “wrongfulness” of the
promisee’s behavior and its effects on the promisor. As traditionally conceived, duress precludes enforcement of an agreement achieved by a
wrongful threat that overcomes free will. 202 As elaborated upon in the modification context, courts will refuse to enforce a supposedly voluntary modification where agreement was procured through a threat of breach and the
subjugated party was unable to secure needed goods or services other than
by acceding to the promisee’s new demands. 203 In particular, courts look to
whether the acquiescing party could have replaced the would-be breaching
party by obtaining the promised performance through other means and recouping its losses through later litigation. In effect, the question is whether
the party accepting the modification had an opportunity to “cover.” 204
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., a 1971 New York Court of Appeals decision, provides an example. 205 In that case, the parties were a government contractor engaged to build military radars, and the subcontractor
supplying specialized gears for the radars. 206 As a result of rising material
costs, Austin, the subcontractor, threated to discontinue performance if it
did not receive several additional subcontracts as well as retroactive price
increases on gears already promised or provided. 207 Loral, the government
199

Id.
Id.
201
See id. This is, of course, one interpretation from among many. For other readings of Roth
Steel, see Johnston, supra note 185, at 379–90 (reading the second prong of the Roth Steel test as
requiring an assessment of the promisee’s motive consistent with the foregone benefit approach to
good faith); Snyder, supra note 160, at 676 (suggesting that the Roth Steel test, influenced by the
doctrine of duress, tolerates some coercive modifications and arguing for an alternative test focused directly on coercion).
202
See 7-28 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 28.2.
203
See Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175; Meredith R. Miller, Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in
Economic Duress, Contract Modification and Framing, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 357, 358–61 (2006)
(discussing the doctrine).
204
“Cover” refers to a buyer’s right to purchase replacement goods following breach by a
seller. See U.C.C. § 2-712.
205
272 N.E.2d 533.
206
Id. at 534.
207
Id. at 535.
200
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contractor, was obligated to provide the radars to the military under stringent time constraints subject to liquidated damages and cancellation clauses. 208 After contacting its other approved suppliers, none of whom could
guarantee performance within its timeframe, Austin agreed to Loral’s demands. 209 In the subsequent dispute over the enforceability of the modification, the New York Court of Appeals held that Loral’s concession was extracted by duress. 210 Central to the court’s holding was Loral’s inability to
find timely replacement gears and the consequences of a possible default. It
noted that none of the replacement suppliers Loral contacted could guarantee timely delivery and that, because Loral was producing a highly specialized military product, it would have been extremely risky to consider other
non-approved vendors. 211
This is not to suggest that the law of modification is coextensive with
the rule of duress. 212 The point simply is that, whatever doctrine one applies, the contemporary law of modifications is about coercion, not consideration. The common law continues to assume modifications without consideration are unenforceable, but it allows an increasingly broad array of
exceptions based on fairness and unforeseen circumstances. The UCC inverts the PELDR altogether. The Code assumes modifications are enforceable, provided they are objectively justified and honestly obtained.
III. A CONTRACT LAW APPROACH TO MID-TERM MODIFICATIONS:
THE REASONABLE NOTICE RULE
The previous Part describes the contemporary approach to the enforcement of contract modifications in mainstream contract law, which emphasizes good faith and voluntariness. This Part reexamines mid-term modi208

Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
210
Id. at 536.
211
Id. at 537. See generally Miller, supra note 203 (providing an extensive reconsideration of
the Austin decision).
212
Duress sets an extremely high bar for voiding a contract to which parties objectively appear to have agreed. See generally Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress
Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443 (2005) (discussing courts’ limited application of the doctrine of
duress). Commentators differ on whether the common law duress defense, which survives the
codification of commercial law, ought to replace the good faith modification standard, or whether
the two doctrines have independent purposes. Compare Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19–
20 (1981) (discussing whether contract modifications should be “framed . . . in terms of good faith
. . . [or] in terms of duress”), and Hillman, supra note 155, at 879 (arguing that contract modifications should be analyzed under the doctrine of duress), with Johnston, supra note 185, at 377–78
(arguing “the opposite view” of Professor Hillman, that duress doctrine is ill suited to analyze
modifications), and Snyder, supra note 160, at 674–77 (asserting that “the duress standard is too
restrictive when applied to a modification”).
209
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fication jurisprudence through this lens. It argues that a reasonable notice
rule, similar to that adopted by the California Supreme Court in the context
of handbook modifications, should apply to all mid-term modifications of
at-will employment. Section A argues that such a rule reflects the process
concerns that underlie the notion of good faith modification by constraining
employers’ ability to threaten immediate termination while retaining the
basic principles of employment at will. 213 Section B argues that reasonable
notice also serves as the consideration required under traditional common
law modification analysis. 214 The proposed rule is therefore consistent with
both the theory and doctrine of mainstream contract modification law.
A. Reasonable Notice as Contractual Good Faith
Mid-term modification jurisprudence, examined through the lens of
contemporary contract law, appears starkly retrograde. Contrary to the
UCC’s interdiction against overly technical applications of the consideration doctrine, mid-term modification law is highly formalistic. Either consideration is satisfied because the employer hypothetically forbore from
exercising its right to terminate, or it is satisfied because the employer provided some independent, but often employment-dependent, benefit. In this
way, both mid-term modification approaches are reminiscent of the early
common law workarounds of the traditional PELDR.215 The unilateral approach is the equivalent of the traditional “rescission/new contract” exception, under which parties were deemed to have released one another from
their original contract and formed a new one under new terms. 216 The formal approach replicates the “nominal benefit” exception under which courts
seize on any identifiable change in the performance of the promisee to justify a conclusion that new consideration was supplied. 217
What courts have failed to do in analyzing mid-term modifications is
to consider whether a particular modification is consistent with the contemporary doctrine of contractual good faith. What a “good faith” modification
looks like is far from obvious when that concept is imported to the employment context. Employers are free to hire on whatever terms they wish
and terminate workers for any or no reason. Indeed, contemporary justifications for employment at will rest in large part on the need for significant
deference to termination decisions given the costs of judicial assessment of

213

See infra notes 215–262 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 263–295 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
214

2016]

Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts

469

employer discretion. 218 Allowing courts to assess employers’ rationale for
modifying terms, consistent with good faith’s commercial reasonableness
test, would be incompatible with these principles.
Employment at will, however, does not preclude judicial inquiry into
the manner in which a modification is obtained. This second prong of the
UCC test can support an employment law reading of good faith that requires reasonable advance notice of mid-term modifications. Such a rule
strikes a balance between preserving flexibility and preventing coercion by
ensuring that the employee has an opportunity to consider alternatives before acquiescing to the modification. Subsection 1 redefines the duty of
good faith in employment law as a procedural obligation. 219 Subsection 2
demonstrates how a reasonable notice rule fulfills employers’ duty of procedural good faith in the mid-term modification context. 220
1. Redefining Good Faith in Continuing Employment Relationships
Claims sounding in good faith have had little traction in the employment context. Courts historically have expressed concern that any constraint
on employer discretion, even one tied to bad faith behavior, violates the
doctrine of employment at will. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,
a 1983 decision of the New York Court of Appeals, illustrates this view. 221
In that case, the court rejected a claim by an accountant allegedly fired for
reporting financial mismanagement. 222 Although the court acknowledged
the existence of the implied duty of good faith as a general matter, it held
that the application of the duty must be limited by “other terms of the [employment] agreement.” 223 Noting that the law accorded the employer “an
unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time,” the court asserted, “it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the
employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his
right of termination.” 224
218

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996). For further discussion of this position and the economic defense of employment at will more generally, see Arnow-Richman, Just Cause to Just
Notice, supra note 26.
219
See infra notes 221–248 and accompanying text.
220
See infra notes 249–262 and accompanying text.
221
448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983).
222
Id.
223
Id. at 91.
224
Id.; see also Gomez v. Trs. of Harvard Univ., 676 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1987) (rejecting
the applicability of good faith to at-will employment relationships); Cramer v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
914 N.E.2d 447, 455 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (same). See generally James J. Brudney, Reluctance
and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 773 (2011) (discussing how the absence of regulation ensuring fair
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Other jurisdictions have been less hostile to employee good faith
claims than New York. But even those that accept such claims, have done so
only in narrow circumstances involving the employer’s failure to pay deferred compensation. 225 This limited reading has been endorsed by the Restatement of Employment Law, notwithstanding scholarly criticism, 226 and it
appears that no court has adopted the broad definitions of good faith espoused by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and UCC in the context of
employment at will.227
Even so, it would be premature to write off the duty of good faith in
employment altogether. Murphy and most other employment law cases addressing good faith do so in the context of termination rather than modificatermination in employment law constrains courts in applying the duty of good faith in at-will employment contracts).
225
See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) (permitting cause of action for recovery of lost commissions where employee was terminated following consummation of sale but prior to full accrual under employer’s policy); Phillips v. U.S. Bank,
781 N.W.2d 540, 544–45 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that bank violated contractual good faith
requirement by terminating its employee in order to deprive her of payment that had accrued before her termination); cf. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 750 (Idaho 1989)
(“[W]ithout tying the violation of the covenant to the ‘amorphous concept of bad faith,’ we conclude that any action by either party which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit
of the employment contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing . . . .” (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985))). The
facts of such cases hew closely to the narrow “forgone benefit” approach to good faith advanced
by Professor Steven Burton rather than the broader definition espoused by the UCC and Restatement of Contracts. See Burton, supra note 183, at 400–01 (citing Fortune, 364 N.E.2d 1251, as an
example of the proper scope of the duty of good faith consistent with his “forgone benefits” theory
of the duty).
226
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“The implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment relationships . . . . [It] includes the duty
not to terminate or seek to terminate the employment relationship for the purpose of . . . preventing the vesting or accrual of an employee right or benefit . . . .”). For a critique of this position, see
Finkin et al., supra note 115, at 138–41 (challenging the drafters of the Restatement to justify their
departure from the application of good faith in mainstream contract law).
227
Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 2015); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981); supra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. But see Finkin et al., supra note 115, at 138–
41 (suggesting that the law of some jurisdictions, including Delaware and Alaska, can support a
broader reading of the doctrine in employment). This limited understanding of good faith in employment has led to pessimism among some employment law scholars as to the utility of the covenant in the at-will context. See Brudney, supra note 224, at 807–08 (concluding that entrenched
notions of employment at will are likely to continue deterring courts from applying the duty of
good faith broadly to terminations); Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV.
1233, 1233–34 (1992) (suggesting abandoning the concept of good faith in favor of other theories
of wrongful discharge). Others persist in pushing for a more expansive reading, albeit without
success. See, e.g., J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 371–76 (1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 684–87 (1990).
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tion, and it is by no means clear that the same standard ought to apply. 228
Good faith arises from and endures only as long as the parties’ contract, and
it is arguably in the course of their relationship that the duty does most of its
work. In the commercial context, the defense of bad faith modification is a
distinct doctrine separate and apart from the general breach of good faith
duty claim. Indeed it is during renegotiation that parties are most likely to
rely on relational norms like trust and fair dealing229—contexts and expectations that may not be well reflected in existing case law. 230 When such matters are litigated, as with mid-term modifications, it may makes sense to
apply a broader understanding of good faith than would be applicable in
assessing an alleged breach of performance.
Moreover, the inconsistency between employment at will and the duty
of good faith arises primarily where the latter doctrine is equated with a
substantive limitation on employer discretion—in Murphy, a limitation on
the allowable reasons for termination. But good faith in employment can
also be understood as a procedural obligation, one that requires employers
to act fairly in carrying out discretionary modifications that are otherwise
immune from substantive review. 231
A reasonable notice rule, similar to that adopted in the handbook cases,
embodies that obligation. To be sure, no court has yet tied the unilateral
modification plus notice approach to principles of good faith, 232 and there
228
Scholars have recognized the many different and distinct roles good faith plays in interpreting and enforcing contracts in elaborating on the doctrine’s meaning. See, e.g., E. Allan
Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW 153, 163 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (noting that good faith can be used
to limit the exercise of contractually conferred discretion, to proscribe behavior that violates
community standards of decency, or as a means of implying a term to fill a gap in the parties’
contract).
229
See Macneil, supra note 13, at 874 (suggesting that, for long-term relationships, the “reference point” for understanding the legitimacy and appropriateness of contractual adjustments, must
be “the entire relation as it had developed to the time of the change in question”); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395,
422–25 (2013) (demonstrating that parties are more likely to eschew contractual precautions and
rely on interpersonal trust once a contract has formed than during the contract formation process).
230
See Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99
MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2054–57 (2015) (suggesting that good faith operates in practice as a “rule of
conduct” requiring reasonable behavior between contracting parties and conformity with industry
norms notwithstanding its more limited application by courts in the context of litigated claims of
breach).
231
See Charles v. Interior Regional Hous. Auth., 55 P.3d 57, 62 (Alaska 2002) (suggesting
that the “objective aspect” of the covenant of good faith requires an employer to “act in a manner
that a reasonable person would regard as fair” (emphasis added)). This understanding of the duty
of good faith in employment, seemingly unique to Alaska, is discussed in greater detail infra notes
249–262 and accompanying text.
232
The unilateral modification plus notice cases offer no coherent explanation for why notice
is required; indeed that obligation is at odds with those courts’ characterization of employment as
a unilateral contract. See Apps, supra note 105, at 915 (noting this inconsistency). The closest that
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has been little scholarship exploring the connection. 233 Yet, the doctrine and
policy behind contemporary modification law appear to supply a ready
foundation for the rule, as well as a basis for extending it to other mid-term
modifications. Reasonable notice effectuates the goals of the second prong
of the UCC modification test by policing the way in which employers secure assent to their proposed modification. Irrespective of employment at
will, an employer’s threat of immediate termination is a distinct form of pressure that derives its power from the existing and, from the employee’s perspective, exclusive contractual relationship.234 Finding alternate employment
takes time, and the best way to finance a job search is to remain employed. 235
has been offered is an analogy to administrative agencies, which have the authority to issue and
revise rules at their election subject to a notice and comment period. See Demasse v. ITT Corp.,
984 P.2d 1138, 1158 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE § 4.44 (3d ed. 1992)).
As previously discussed, the Restatement of Employment drafters cite this analogy with approval.
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b; supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, these courts and commentators consider only the notice aspect of the administrative
process in drawing this analogy. None suggest that employees ought to have a formal process
through which to protest or influence the content of the employer’s proposed changes consistent
with the administrative comment process.
233
The key exception is Apps, supra note 105, at 916–20, which explores the use of the good
faith doctrine to support the handbook notice rule by reference to the comparable, but more expansive requirement, of “mutual trust and confidence” under English law. Cf. Slawson, supra note
105, at 23 (critiquing the unilateral modification plus notice approach, but asserting that the duty
of good faith would limit an employer’s discretion to modify its handbooks and policies under any
provision expressly reserving that right).
234
See Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (remarking that “[u]nemployment at a
future time is disturbing—its immediacy is formidable” in rejecting unilateral modification approach to enforceability of mid-term noncompete).
235
It is unclear whether an employee terminated for refusing to accept a mid-term modification could receive unemployment insurance. Employees may not receive compensation during
unemployment resulting from a voluntary termination or termination for misconduct, including
refusing work orders. See, e.g., Doby v. Okla. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 823 P.2d 390, 392–93 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1991) (holding that employee who refused to take a drug test was terminated for misconduct and thus was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits). At least some states
will allow benefits to an employee terminated for refusing to accept unlawful or unreasonable
terms of employment. See, e.g., Tourte v. Oriole of Naples, Inc., 696 So. 2d 1283, 1284–86 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that former employee who voluntarily resigned because her employer required her to leave her secretarial position for a more “stressful” sales position was entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits); Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 669 N.E.2d
431, 432–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that former employee who voluntarily resigned following employer insistence that she change shifts to one during which she had no child care was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits). Regardless, unemployment insurance is a weak
substitute for continued employment. Most workers receive approximately half of their weekly
earnings, subject to a state-imposed cap. See Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative
Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 444 (2014)
(broadly describing U.S. unemployment system); Frans Pennings & Paul M. Secunda, Towards
the Development of Governance Principles for the Administration of Social Protection Benefits:
Comparative Lessons from Dutch and American Experiences, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 313, 331–33 (2015) (examining Wisconsin’s unemployment system). In addition,
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The employer who requires a worker to accept a mid-term modification on
penalty of immediate termination capitalizes on that reality, effectively preventing the employee from meaningfully evaluating the new terms by
“shopping around” prior to acceptance.
In this way, the reasonable notice rule also reflects one of the core
components of the economic duress doctrine. The modern version of the
doctrine will void a contract where the promisee secures assent through an
“improper threat . . . that leaves the [promisor] no reasonable alternative.” 236 In the context of modification, an “alternative” refers to an available source of the goods or services owed under the pre-existing contract. 237
Assent is deemed lacking in those cases where, due to the circumstances or
the urgency of the promisee’s modification demand, the promisor is unable
to find a replacement supplier. 238 In the employment context, the equivalent
supplier is a new employer, and the ability to find one hinges on the employee’s receipt of sufficient advance notice.

some evidence suggests that it is more difficult to find new work while unemployed than while holding a job. See generally Winnie Hu, When Being Jobless Is a Barrier to Finding a Job, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/nyregion/for-many-being-out-of-work-is-chiefobstacle-to-finding-it.html [http://perma.cc/K4YH-T9LL] (discussing long-term unemployment’s
effect on job applicants and state legislative efforts to prevent discrimination of unemployed); Jennifer Peltz, NYC Adopts Tough Jobless-Discrimination Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nyc-adopts-tough-jobless-discrimination-law/
[https://
perma.cc/AUZ7-L3M7] (discussing New York City’s new law banning discrimination of unemployed); Brad Plumer, Companies Won’t Even Look at Resumes of the Long-Term Unemployed,
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/04/15/companieswont-even-look-at-resumes-of-the-long-term-unemployed/ [https://perma.cc/UAQ9-WNN2] (discussing reasons for and possible solutions to companies’ aversion to hiring candidates who are unemployed); Megan Woolhouse, Project Aims to Assist Long-Term Unemployed: MIT Professor
Launching Effort to Help Them Overcome Barriers, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 17, 2013), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/business/2013/11/17/the-science-rejection-helping-long-term-unemployed/sZRfIq
C77cyYQ2ZZNcgv7L/story.html [http://perma.cc/W8Y6-4WUT] (discussing study that found employers showed four times more interest in candidates experiencing short-term rather than longterm unemployment, even if the former had less experience and fewer qualifications).
236
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175.
237
See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971); supra notes
178–212 and accompanying text.
238
A similar rationale underlies the UCC’s rule requiring reasonable advance notice of contract termination. See U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (recognizing that “the application of principles of
good faith and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination of
a going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement”); Pharo Distrib. v. Stahl, 782 S.W.2d 635, 638–38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
breach of contract because distributor’s provision of only six days’ notice of termination deprived
the sub-distributor of “an opportunity to make appropriate arrangement[s],” such as finding a
replacement supplier, unloading inventory, and making workforce adjustments). In a previous
work, the author discusses this law in greater detail, proposing an analogous interpretation of employment law that would require reasonable advance notice of at-will termination. See ArnowRichman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1545–48.
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To be sure, this is not a precise analogy. Employers have no underlying
contractual obligation to retain workers employed at will. Hence, a threat of
termination, regardless of its form, does not herald the breach of a legal duty. 239 Yet, the threat of breach standard is merely an elaboration on the requirement that the promisee’s conduct be wrongful, and one of limited utility in the modification context. 240 All modification demands are implicit or
explicit threats not to perform a binding obligation; 241 at the same time, a
modification demand may be coercive even if it does not endanger preexisting legal rights. 242 The question is how and under what circumstances
the demand is made. Although the law inclines naturally toward legal baselines, 243 other means of assessing coercion are possible and appropriate. 244
Thus, it has been suggested in the philosophical literature that a proposal
may be coercive notwithstanding its legality where the offeror limits or undermines the offeree’s freedom to create or pursue a more desirable situation. 245 Such conduct distinguishes offers that merely exploit an offeree
239

See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 83, 122–24 (1996) (explaining how an employer’s freedom to determine who to hire and
whether to fire precludes application of the duress defense to employment arbitration agreements
regardless of when the employee consented).
240
Indeed the meaning of “wrongful” or “improper” for purposes of establishing the general
defense of duress has been equally if not more contested. Compare Giesel, supra note 212, at 448
(emphasizing the lack of reasonable alternatives available to the promisor over the wrongfulness
of the threat), with Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717,
718–20 (2005) (eschewing classic duress formulation in favor of enforcing contracts formed under
a credible, rather than strategic, threat in order to preserve promisor’s ability to make a binding
commitment to its choice of last resort). The Restatement offers a catalogue of circumstances
under which a threat should be deemed “improper” for purposes of duress. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176.
241
See Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175,
198 (1997) (“[A]ny proposal to modify an existing contract could be construed as a threat of
breach, but that would be a highly undesirable result . . . .”).
242
Id. at 183–85 (describing scenarios in which a proposal is not wrongful in the legal sense,
but it appears that the promisor should be relieved of his or her promise due to business compulsion).
243
See Snyder, supra note 160, at 679 (asserting that such baselines are “within the competence of the law” in proposing a coercion-based UCC modification test that turns on the presence
of a threat to deprive the victim of a legal right); Stewart, supra note 241, at 237–38 (rejecting
“empirical theories” of coercion in favor of a legal baseline in proposing a narrow, formal account
of duress that does not “depend on factors extrinsic to law itself”).
244
See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204–21 (1987) (discussing various moral and nonmoral baselines for determining whether an offer is coercive).
245
See David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 133–34 (1981).
Zimmerman uses the example of an employer who kidnaps and abandons a worker on a desert
island where it is the only employer and then offers employment at a subsistence wage. Id.; cf.
Giesel, supra note 212, at 492 (“Setting aside a contract on the basis of duress is just and justifiable when one party has no reasonable alternative to the problematic bargain and when the other
party has been proven to be particularly blameworthy regarding the constrained nature of the
deal.”).
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whose limited options owe to independent or pre-existing circumstances. 246
This framework describes precisely the situation of the at-will employee
presented with a mid-term modification. The employee’s poor bargaining
position owes principally to the dominant rule of employment at will, but
the employer’s choice to present the modification on penalty of immediate
termination exacerbates the pre-existing power imbalance. 247 Having received no advance warning, the employee must accept the new terms without any realistic opportunity to better his or her bargaining position by seeking an alternative offer.
In sum, a reasonable notice requirement operates to separate wrongfully exacted modifications from legitimate ones by ensuring a period of time
between the announcement of a modification and its implementation. It removes the threat of an immediate loss of income, which would otherwise
force employee acquiescence. More importantly, it guarantees the employee
a period of time in which he or she can rely on the old terms and consider
alternatives. 248 Rather than having to unconditionally accept the modification, the employee has an opportunity to compose his or her response,
whether it is an attempt at negotiation, an adjustment in expectations, or a
decision to seek a “replacement supplier” in the form of a new employer.
2. Achieving Good Faith Employment Modifications Through Reasonable
Notice
The proposed theory of procedural good faith has yet to be explicitly
adopted by courts, but there is at least some case law demonstrating its potential applicability. The Alaska Supreme Court has drawn the connection
between good faith and advance notice of mid-term modifications in the
context of an employer drug testing policy. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc., a case heard in the Alaska State Supreme Court in both 1989
(Luedtke I) and 1992 (Luedtke II), involved a drilling rig worker who was
246
See Zimmerman, supra note 245, at 133–34. Zimmerman distinguishes an offer from a
second island employer who has no part in confining the worker to the island but offers a similarly
depressed wage, labeling this offer exploitive rather than coercive. Id.
247
In this way, this Article distinguishes its proposal from those that would set aside contracts
in recognition of limited volitional capacity resulting from particular societal inequities. See, e.g.,
Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171, 198 (2013)
(calling for a broader duress doctrine that takes account of existing power imbalances between the
parties in the context of spousal agreements).
248
Because of the advance notice requirement, one would anticipate that in most cases the
employee would not be subjected to discharge for refusing to accept a mid-term modification until
the date of implementation. It might be necessary, however, to recognize a cause of action for
breach of the duty of good faith where the employer anticipatorily terminates the worker for an
expected refusal to acquiesce. Of course, the employer would remain free to terminate for other
reasons during the notice period consistent with employment at will.
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suspended for testing positive for marijuana and terminated when he failed
to appear for a retest. 249 In its first decision, the court found nothing unlawful in the employee’s termination, concluding that the employer’s interest in
safety outweighed the employee's interest in privacy. 250 In the second decision, however, it held that the employer’s initial suspension of the employee
violated the duty of good faith because the employer had failed to provide
the worker with advance notice of its drug testing policy. 251 Analogizing to
the UCC, the court explained that the duty of good faith not only has substantive content, but also requires that the employer act in “a manner which
a reasonable person would regard as fair.” 252
In many ways, Luedtke II is an outlier, sounding principally in privacy
law and the public policy tort. 253 It appears that the procedural limitations
the court imposes on employer discretion owe more to the bodily integrity
issues implicated in drug testing than to the court’s understanding of the
contract rights of the employee. 254 Yet, the connection the court draws between notice and the duty of good faith is informative. In adopting a reasonable notice requirement, the court explains:
We agree that there is no evidence of subjective bad faith on Nabors’ part, but . . . the covenant of good faith and fair dealing also
requires that the employer be objectively fair. . . . As we stated in
Luedtke I: . . . “[b]y requiring a test, an employer introduces an
additional term of employment. An employee should have notice
of the additional term so that he may contest it, refuse to accept it
and quit, seek to negotiate its conditions, or prepare for the test so
that he will not fail it and thereby suffer sanctions.” 255
In short, the court invoked all of the hallmarks of a modification achieved in
good faith under the procedural prong of the mainstream contract rule.
The handbook modification cases adopting a reasonable notice rule
similarly provide guidance as to how a procedural good faith rule might
operate. Asmus v. Pacific Bell, the key California Supreme Court decision
from 2000, does not invoke the duty of good faith in its analysis, but the
249

Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Luedtke II), 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Luedtke I), 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989).
251
Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1222, 1226.
252
Id. at 1224.
253
See id. In Alaska, the prohibition against terminations that violate public policy, a freestanding tort in most jurisdictions, is “largely encompassed within the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.” Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986).
254
Luedtke I extensively discussed various sources of state law protection for individual privacy, concluding that the employer’s safety-based interest in drug testing had to be balanced
against the employees’ rights. See Luedtke I, 768 P.2d at 1131–37.
255
Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1225–26 (quoting Luedtke I, 768 P.2d at 1137 (footnote omitted)).
250
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facts of the case offer a clear illustration of procedural fairness consistent
with such principles. 256 There the employer took a series of steps leading up
to the cancelation of its disputed management security policy. The original
MESP included a disclaimer, cautioning managers that it would be maintained only so long as market conditions permitted. 257 Four years after it
issued the MESP, Pacific Bell sent a letter to managers stating that it was
monitoring market conditions and might be forced to change the policy. 258
Two years later the company announced that it would terminate the MESP,
but that the change would occur in six months. 259 Thus, when the employer
ultimately did change its policy, employees had known for six years that it
could happen, for two years that it might happen, and for six months that it
actually would.
To be clear, the point here is not to endorse the particular result in As260
mus. Nor is it to suggest that every policy change should necessitate six
years’ notice, or even six months’ notice. 261 Rather it is to demonstrate the
potential for a robust reasonable notice rule that can ameliorate somewhat
the employee’s untenable position of having to choose between accepting a
modification or facing immediate termination.262 A reasonable notice requirement advances the policies behind contemporary modification law and
in some cases will better serve workers that a formal modification approach
256

Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000).
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 73–74.
260
As previously discussed, the MESP at issue in the case provided that it would terminate
only upon a material change in economic conditions. Id. at 73. Thus it appears that management
intended the policy to be non-modifiable absent such a condition, in which case the court ought to
have enforced the policy as written. See id. at 85 (George, C.J., dissenting) (“When an employment contract specifies that the employer’s obligations will be terminated upon the occurrence of a
future event, the employer is bound by the contract unless and until the event occurs . . . .”); supra
notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
261
This Article takes up the question of the proper notice period infra notes 300–315 and
accompanying text.
262
On this point this Article diverges significantly from the Restatement of Employment
Law’s endorsement of the reasonable notice rule. The Restatement comments state that
257

[o]rdinarily, the reasonableness standard is met when the notice is given in the same
or substantially the same way the original statement was provided or made accessible. The ultimate question is whether the employer provided notice that was reasonably calculated to alert employees to any modification or rescission of material
terms in prior policy statements.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 cmt. d. This suggests that the role of notice is merely to
inform and that notice is effective if it achieves this purpose irrespective of how far in advance it
is given. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the contract modification notion of good faith
previously discussed, as well as with the decided cases on which the Restatement drafters rely.
The facts in Asmus strongly suggest that the California court expects an employer to do more than
simply alert employees as to the policy change. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73–75.
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which requires only a modest and employment-dependent consideration.
Moreover, the rule accomplishes this in a way that is reasonably consistent
both with employment at will and mainstream contract law.
B. Reasonable Notice as Common Law Consideration
The previous section argues that applying a reasonable notice rule to
mid-term modifications better advances the policies underlying contemporary contract modification law by ensuring a modicum of voluntariness in
employees’ assent to proposed modifications, albeit within the constraints
of employment at will. At the same time, a reasonable notice approach can
satisfy the technical requirements of traditional common law to the extent
they still exist. Although commentators have criticized the PELDR and
courts strive to avoid its application, 263 the requirement of consideration
absent unforeseen circumstances remains the black letter rule for common
law contract modifications. 264 That reality, however, does not defeat the
doctrinal legitimacy of a reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifications. Rather reasonable notice can itself provide the requisite consideration
for employee agreement. Thus, although the principal contention of this
Article is that mid-term modification law should advance principles of good
faith rather than cleave to the doctrine of consideration, a reasonable notice
rule actually does both.
Courts’ struggles over the meaning of consideration in the mid-term
modification context are reflective of a larger, long-standing problem in
employment law. Because the employment-at-will relationship is of indefinite duration, and both parties retain discretion to terminate, courts have
often described the arrangement as an illusory contract. 265 Basic principles
of consideration require a commitment on the part of one party in exchange
for the promise or performance of the other. 266 A promisor who retains absolute discretion to perform has made no commitment, and therefore provided nothing of value, that will bind the opposing party.
For years courts have squared the seeming inconsistency between the
at-will nature of employment and the formal requirement of consideration

263

2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.1 (describing the rule as “destined to be overturned” and
noting that some courts have “refused to apply the rule, or ignored it” altogether).
264
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to
a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”); supra notes 148–162 and accompanying text.
265
See Lord, supra note 15, at 714 (“Because the traditional rule allows either party to an atwill relationship to put an end to it at any time, a promise by either the employer or the employee
to continue an existing at-will relationship is by its nature illusory.”).
266
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.
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through appeals to unilateral contract theory. 267 A unilateral contract involves only one promise made with the intention of eliciting a discretionary
performance by the promisee. 268 There is no need for consideration in such
a contract, or better stated, consideration is supplied, and a contract formed,
only if and when the discretionary performance is rendered. Thus, in the
case of employment, courts have theorized that the employer’s offer to employ, and more specifically to compensate, the worker under specified terms
is an offer for a unilateral contract that binds the employer if the employee
chooses to work. 269 As classically formulated, this analysis leaves both parties free to terminate, or more accurately, to revoke—the employer can revoke any time prior to receiving the agreed upon performance, and the employee was never bound to begin with.
This model rests on an artificially discrete notion of the employment
contract, one that is ill equipped to account for the larger relational context
beyond the bare exchange of wages for work. 270 In reality, parties to an employment relationship often make many promises, implicit and explicit,
from which they reasonably develop expectations about the future. 271 More
importantly, they often make or solicit written promises with the intention
that they be prospectively binding both at the outset and during the course
of their relationship. 272 Such commitments belie the notion that employment
is unilateral. An employee who has restricted his ability to compete postemployment is hardly in the position of the hypothetical offeree who, in
entertaining an offer for a unilateral contract, is free to perform or not. To
267

2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2. The recognition of employee handbooks as contractual
documents has cemented this view. See Pettit, supra note 134, at 551–52 (discussing courts’ appeal to unilateral contract theory in enforcing employer handbooks).
268
2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2.
269
See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81 (describing a company’s management security policy as
an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of which was accepted by employees via
their continued employment); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 96
(Conn. 1995) (“To determine the contents of any particular implied contract of employment, the
factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship must be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983)
(describing employer’s personnel manual as an “offer of a unilateral contract” that the employee
accepted through “continued performance of his duties despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J.) (describing an employer’s personnel manual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for
action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work when they have no obligation
to continue”), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2; Yoder, supra note 105, at 1523.
270
The foregoing discussion summarizes and expands upon issues discussed in the author’s
prior work. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at
1563–68 (critiquing application of unilateral contract theory to employment relationships).
271
See Arnow-Richman, Foreword, supra note 35, at 1–3 (describing complex mix of obligations, expectations, and informal promises between employers and employees).
272
Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563.
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the extent they are otherwise enforceable, the terms of the covenant contractually bind the employee, irrespective of his or her ability to decide whether
and when to cease work.
The existence of mid-term modifications underscores the inadequacy
of a unilateral contract framework. Indeed, modification is anathema to unilateral contract theory, which finds no contract until performance is already
complete. To use the classic example, if A promises B she will pay him
$200 if he walks across the Brooklyn Bridge, there is no contract and nothing to modify until B crosses. 273 A can choose to change the terms for any
future performance, that is, she can tell B that she will pay him to cross
again at a lower rate or under different conditions. But contract law does not
allow her to alter the terms of her promise or the required performance during the course of B’s crossing. Rather she must hold the promise open for a
reasonable amount of time to enable B to complete the performance he has
begun. 274 In persisting with a unilateral contract framework, courts enforcing mid-term modifications are effectively treating every change in terms as
the completion of one contract and the start of a new one. This parceling out
of work into a series of discrete performances accords neither with reality
nor with party expectations. 275 From the perspective of the employee, certainly, it feels more like the terms have changed while he was making his
way across the bridge. 276
Viewed in this light, employment is better characterized as a bilateral
contract of indefinite duration, one in which both parties make futurelooking promises yet preserve significant discretion as to their scope and
duration. From this perspective, reasonable notice reveals itself as a means
of limiting party discretion, thereby supplying the modicum of obligation
necessary to render the relationship binding. This idea resonates with the
broader duty of good faith that applies not merely in the context of modification but throughout the contractual relationship as a way of ensuring that
273

This example is generally attributed to Professor I. Maurice Wormser’s article The True
Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916). See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 93 (2010).
274
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45.
275
Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Mich. 1987) (describing this characterization as “strikingly artificial” because “[f]ew employers and employees begin each day contemplating whether to renew or modify the employment contract in effect at the close of work on
the previous day”).
276
The burden of this result on the offeree is precisely why the Restatement (Second) of Contracts drafters rejected the classical rule permitting revocation up until the point of completed
performance. It is surprising, if not ironic, that courts permit such an outcome in the case of an
employee, an especially vulnerable offeree, in view of the fact that both contemporary courts and
contract scholars have seen fit to do away with the rule in the context of mainstream contract relationships, including between parties of more equal bargaining power.
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one party does not abuse the legitimate expectations of the other. In a case
where contractually reserved discretion is broad enough to potentially render a proffered performance or promise illusory, the implied duty tempers
the promisor’s exercise of discretion thereby infusing the relationship with
consideration. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the well-known 1917 New
York Court of Appeals case involving a fashionista’s grant of an exclusive
marketing right to a promoter, provides the classic illustration. 277 Although
the parties’ contract did not expressly bind the promoter to do anything,
then-Judge Cardozo implied an obligation on his part to use reasonable efforts to market and sell Lady Duff’s merchandise. 278
In the employment context, reasonable notice is arguably playing the
same role as Cardozo’s implied reasonable efforts term, both with respect to
initial terms of employment, as well as at the point of modification. This is
clearest in the context of employee handbooks where the reasonable notice
rule evolved. When an employer issues a handbook, those courts that permit
unilateral modification are assuming that the employer has committed to
abiding by the policy only temporarily, reserving discretion to terminate or
alter it in the future. 279 Were that all, the initial handbook policies might be
deemed illusory, dependent on the whim of the employer, who might
change or cancel them at any moment. But a reasonable notice requirement
creates a limitation on that discretion, justifying the employee’s reliance, at
least while the policy is in effect. 280

277

118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
Id. at 215.
279
One question courts have faced is whether the employer must expressly reserve that discretion in its initial policy documents in order to subsequently terminate or modify their terms.
Several courts faced with this question have held that the power to modify is implicit given the
absence of a fixed term for the original policy. See, e.g., Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 121 (concluding
that employer “may . . . unilaterally change a written discharge-for-cause policy . . . even though
the right . . . was not expressly reserved at the outset”); see also Slawson, supra note 105, at 29
(opining that a right to make procedural adjustments is an implicit term of any employee handbook). Such cases, however, are unlikely to continue to arise with any frequency insofar as the
inclusion of disclaimer language limiting the duration and enforceability of employer-issued policies has become a standard tool in management-side legal practice. Rather, the more common
question is whether the inclusion of such language defeats the significance of the original terms
altogether. In reported cases about modifications, the employer usually concedes for the purpose
of litigation that the original terms were binding irrespective of such disclaimer language.
280
To the extent that the duty of good faith applies to areas of reserved employer discretion, it
is possible to imagine an implied obligation not only to provide employees reasonable notice of
proposed changes in terms, but also to keep the original policy in effect for a reasonable period of
time. Asmus lends support to that view. 999 P.2d at 73 (“An employer may unilaterally terminate a
policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of indefinite duration, and the
employer effects the change after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering
with the employees’ vested benefits.” (emphasis added)). The Asmus court notes, and the facts
show, both that the employees enjoyed the benefits of the MESP for a significant period of time
278

482
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More importantly, reasonable notice provides an additional consideration at the point in time at which the employer attempts to alter or retract its
terms. Thus, if an employer announces that as of the next fiscal year it will
prospectively modify its formal vacation policy to reduce the amount of
paid time off accrued per week of service, affected employees have the benefit of a policy with a fixed duration rather than one with an indefinite
term. 281 In short, the reasonable notice requirement has the effect of requiring the employer to maintain and abide by its original terms for an amount
of time equivalent to the length of the notice period. Moreover, if the employer asserts that employees must sign the new policy to remain employed,
of that they will be deemed to have accepted it by continuing to work past
its effective date, reasonable notice also serves to temporarily protect an
employee from termination based on his or he opposition to changed terms.
It postpones the point in time at which the employee must accept or risk
being fired.
In the noncompete and arbitration contexts, reasonable notice would
play the same role, albeit in temporarily preserving the employee’s background rights rather than fixing the length of a contractually conferred benefit. An employer that provides reasonable notice of a required noncompete
or arbitration agreement to an incumbent employee implicitly grants that
employee a defined amount of time in which he or she can continue to rely
on and enforce the underlying rights. For the duration of the notice period,
the employee can sue the employer in court or defect to a competitor. In the
language of consideration, the employer is promising to forebear from soliciting a waiver of those rights for the length of the notice period.
This understanding of the relationship between reasonable notice and
contract consideration helps explain the unique inquiry into limitations on
employer discretion in the context of arbitration policies. As discussed previously, when determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements
courts have generally required the employer to make a reciprocal promise to
arbitrate, both where arbitration agreements are presented mid-employment
as well as at the outset of the relationship.282 In a number of cases, employand that Pacific Bell gave its employees reasonable and ample notice of its intent to terminate the
MESP. See id.
281
The use of an example that does not involve a job security policy is intentional, as this
Article focuses on the modification of at-will employment terms. The special situation of employer handbook policies purporting to limit employers’ termination rights is discussed infra notes
316–344 and accompanying text.
282
As previously noted, it is anomalous that some courts are unwilling to treat an offer of atwill employment as the consideration for an arbitration agreement entered into at the start of the
relationship. Courts almost universally find that such an offer suffices as consideration for a noncompete, irrespective of the employer’s discretion to terminate at will. But to the extent these
courts treat a promise of at-will employment as illusory for arbitration purposes, it is not surpris-
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ees have challenged the binding nature of the employer’s promise, arguing
that because the employer retained the power to cancel or alter its policy, its
promise was illusory, rendering the employee’s own promise to arbitrate
unenforceable. 283 Courts have recognized, however, that if the employer
limits its ability to cancel or alter the policy in some way, as by promising
that changes will be adopted only upon advance notice, this will sufficiently
constrain employer discretion, creating a binding reciprocal contract to arbitrate. 284
At least one court has gone further and implied an obligation on the
part of the employer to provide reasonable notice of unilateral changes to its
arbitration policy in order to preclude a finding that the employer’s promise
to arbitrate was illusory. Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., a
2013 California Court of Appeal case involved both an arbitration agreement and a handbook policy. 285 The issue there was not the validity of a
modification, but rather the conscionability of the employer’s arbitration
program, which the employee consented to at the time of hire. 286 The
ing that they are unwilling to find consideration in an employer’s promise to abide by an arbitration policy that reserves significant employer discretion.
283
See, e.g., Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting
that “where one party to an arbitration agreement seeks to invoke arbitration to settle a dispute, if
the other party can suddenly change the terms of the agreement to avoid arbitration, then the
agreement was illusory from the outset”); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 15 (D.
Me. 2001) (declaring that “it would be fundamentally unfair to hold Plaintiff to the terms of the
booklet, when Defendant retains its ability to evade the booklet’s terms entirely”); Baker v. Bristol
Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 776–77 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (stating that if the employer “retains
unilateral authority to amend the agreement retroactively, its promise to arbitrate is illusory”);
Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 15 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (noting in rejecting arbitration agreement that “although Defendant cannot modify the terms of the Arbitration Agreement
any way or at any time, it may, in its sole discretion, modify the terms of the Arbitration Agreement provided that it complies with the minimal formalities set forth”); Jenkins v. United
Healthcare, No. 7371-99, 2000 WL 298912, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2000) (asserting that
unilateral provisions “to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the [arbitration policy] at any time” does
not give adequate notice of the terms and “[s]uch a lack of consideration vitiates any contract
between the parties”).
284
See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 F. App’x 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that consideration was sufficient where employer’s “discretion to modify the [arbitration agreement] is limited in two important respects: [i]t must provide employees 60 days’ notice of termination or any modification, and it cannot modify the [agreement] with respect to a previously
submitted claim”); Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (E.D.
Okla. 2003) (noting that the “prospective application of the amendment or termination provisions,
when combined with the ten-day notice provision, constitutes a significant limitation on [the employer’s] right to modify, amend, or cancel such that the agreement to arbitrate is not an illusory
one”); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the ability to modify
or change the arbitration program was not illusory because termination was not retroactive and
would not be effective “until 10 days after reasonable notice of termination is given to Employees”).
285
155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2013).
286
Id. at 509–10.

Boston College Law Review

484

[Vol. 57:427

agreement signed by the employee incorporated by reference the employer’s full arbitration policy, located in the company’s employee handbook,
which stated that both the employee and the company agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. 287 Thus, the policy included the requisite reciprocal
promise by the employer. 288 The handbook in which the policy was located,
however, contained a right-to-revise clause, stating that the employer reserved “the right to revise, modify or delete any provision or policy in this
Handbook . . . at any time.” 289 Similarly, the acknowledgement signed by
the employee upon receipt of the handbook attested to her understanding
that “all policies or practices [in the Handbook] can be changed at any time
by the employer” and that “the employer reserves the right to amend, modify, rescind, delete, supplement or add to the provisions of the Handbook, as
it deems appropriate . . . in its sole discretion.” 290
In her subsequent suit for discrimination and related wrongful termination claims, the employee sought to avoid enforcement of the arbitration
policy, arguing not that the policy was non-binding, but that it was unconscionable based on the employer’s reservation-of-rights provision. 291 The
court rejected this argument, concluding that the implied duty of good faith
placed implicit limits on the employer’s power to modify, preserving the
reciprocal nature of the policy. 292 Citing Asmus, the court observed,
“[I]mplied in the unilateral right to modify is the accompanying obligation
to do so upon reasonable and fair notice.” 293 Thus, the court held that notwithstanding the literal text of the employer’s reservation of rights clause,
the policy would be interpreted to require the employer to provide notice of
any changes pursuant to the implied duty of good faith. 294 “[T]he implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” concluded the court, “saves this
arbitration contract from being illusory.” 295
Although Serpa is not itself a modification case, its analysis of the employer’s reservation of rights clause supports the notion of reasonable notice
287

Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 513.
289
Id. at 509.
290
Id.
291
Id. at 509–10.
292
Id. at 514–15.
293
Id. at 516 (citing Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81).
294
Id. As discussed infra notes 346–371 and accompanying text, this same rationale has been
invoked by courts in refusing to give full effect to similar provisions reserving the right to alter
terms in the context of long-term consumer service agreements. See David Horton, The Shadow
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 630–36 (2010)
(discussing cases involving unilateral imposition of arbitration clauses into consumer credit card
agreements). Indeed, Serpa relied in part on the consumer case law. See Serpa, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 514 (citing Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 281 (Ct. App. 1998)).
295
Serpa, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515.
288
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as a consideration equivalent in the context of a mid-term modification. According to Serpa, the obligation to provide notice can be judicially implied
and its implication cures illusoriness. Just as the implied duty to provide
reasonable notice of employer-initiated changes renders an otherwise illusory promise to arbitrate enforceable, a judicially-created reasonable notice
rule ensures that a modicum of consideration passes to affected employees
whenever the employer exercises its right to unilaterally insist on additional
employee promises or concessions.
IV. THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF A REASONABLE NOTICE RULE
Both employers and worker advocates are likely to be skeptical of the
unilateral modification plus notice approach—the latter due to its failure to
more aggressively limit employers’ modification rights, the former because
of the uncertainty and administrative burden inherent in a reasonableness
standard. This Part offers preliminary thoughts on such issues, beginning in
section A with an examination of the impact of reasonable notice in light of
employees’ limited bargaining power. 296 Section B proposes a reasonable
notice period ranging from approximately two weeks to three months, depending on the nature of the modification. 297 That time period should grant
workers a meaningful opportunity to respond—whether through concerted
activity, personal planning, negotiation, or resignation. It will also offer employers guidance and an outer limit on the extent of notice required, easing
the administrative burden of the rule.
The Part goes on to consider particular application issues, including
the role of reasonable notice in the context of job security promises and the
viability of employer efforts to eliminate the advance notice requirement
through handbook language or form agreements. Section C argues that unilaterally drafted “no notice” clauses should be presumed unenforceable,
consistent with trends in the regulation of consumer contracts. 298 Section D
argues that the applicability of the reasonable notice rule to job security policies must be determined through a case-by-case inquiry, focusing on the
scope of the original promise. 299
A. Reasonable Notice and Employee Bargaining Power
An initial question regarding the adoption of a unilateral modification
plus notice rule is the extent to which advance notice will assist employees.
An explicit premise of this Article is that employees frequently lack the
296

See infra notes 300–315 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 316–344 and accompanying text.
298
See infra notes 346–371 and accompanying text.
299
See infra notes 372–388 and accompanying text.
297
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ability to insist on their preferred terms of employment. 300 The Article also
presupposes the continued existence of employment at will. 301 It is therefore
fair to ask whether reasonable notice will do anything to enhance an employee’s bargaining position in the face of a proposed change in terms. The
answer to that question is contextual, depending in part on the individual
employee and in part on the nature of the modification.
The primary purpose and effect of an advance notice requirement is to
give at-will employees time to explore alternatives. What makes mid-term
modifications especially pernicious is that they constrain employees’ ability
to exercise what is often their only means of opposing unfavorable terms—
the ability to refuse to work. An applicant for employment who is offered
unfavorable terms can at least make a reasoned decision whether to accept
the position in the context of an active job search. 302 He or she can compare
the employer’s terms against other offers, his or her current job, or the desirability of continuing the search. An incumbent employee who is invested
in his or her current position and not actively gauging the market is not able
to make this type of informed decision or take the risk of leaving his or her
job in search of better terms. He or she must simply accept, deferring the
possibility of seeking alternate employment to the indefinite future, while
suffering the unfavorable terms for the duration of employment. 303 Reasonable notice thus creates an opportunity for the incumbent employee to “shop
around.” 304 He or she can more carefully consider the proposed terms, ex-

300

See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
302
This presupposes that the applicant is made aware of all terms of employment in advance
of accepting the job. Not infrequently, however, employees accept or begin employment based
only on core terms (salary, title, etc.) and are provided with the “fine print” terms after accepting
or commencing work. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 374
(6th Cir. 2005) (employees “hired on the spot” signed arbitration agreements days into employment); Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. v. Wilcox, 978 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (D. Minn. 2013) (employee required to sign a “large stack of documents” including noncompete a few days into employment). The author has discussed this problem of “cubewrap” employment terms elsewhere at
length. See Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 966–67 (critiquing cubewrap contracts for exacerbating bargaining power imbalance between employer and employee); ArnowRichman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 640–41 (describing situation where standard form
employment documents are left in employees’ cubicles to be signed shortly after they begin working). Terms provided to the employee immediately after acceptance raise concerns similar to those
that arise in the mid-term modification context and further suggest the possibility of deceptive or
misleading hiring practices. See Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 651.
303
This is especially problematic in the case of mid-term noncompetes, where the employee’s
acquiescence directly impairs his or her ability to subsequently accept work elsewhere. With regard to other mid-term modifications, the harm is simply that the employee is immediately subject
to the new terms and will be until he or she is able to find alternate employment.
304
See Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 663 n.119.
301
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plore the viability of quitting to go elsewhere, and credibly leverage the
threat of departure in negotiating with the current employer. 305
Of course, not all mid-term modifications are likely to be so unwelcome as to prompt employees to seek alternate employment. Neither is the
possibility of alternate employment realistic for all workers even with sufficient notice. In such cases, advance notice can serve as a window for concerted activity, granting employees a period of time to discuss, critique, and
potentially protest the change in terms. The opportunity for collective consideration of changed terms is especially important and appropriate in situations involving less salient modifications and those that apply to the workforce as a whole. An individual employee confronted with a formal noncompete contract may have some appreciation of the significance of that
agreement. 306 Employees confronted with an arbitration policy may be less
likely to understand its implications, and may disregard it entirely if it is
packaged as part of the employer’s general policies. 307 Disseminating the
policy in advance with a designated effective date, however, creates an opportunity for the unusually conscientious employee to examine its contents
and communicate with others workers. These “readers” can offer their opinions about the employer’s terms, gain the interest and attention of their coworkers, and potentially trigger group action. 308
Although the days of aggressive labor actions have long past, there has
been renewed attention to concerted activity perpetuated by individuals or
305
For instance, a valuable employee asked to sign a noncompete may be able to influence
the breadth of the agreement—its duration, geographic scope, or definition of competition—even
if he or she is unable to refuse the agreement completely.
306
Cf. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV.
1163, 1167 (2001) (questioning whether employees accepting formal noncompetes have
knowledge of the risks involved).
307
See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1203,
1225 (2002) (“Most employment applicants, though able to identify the most basic differences
between arbitration and litigation, do not understand the remedial and procedural ramifications of
consenting to arbitration. Very few are aware of what they are waiving when they agree to mandatory arbitration.”).
308
This is similar to the notion put forth by some commentators in the consumer contract
context, namely that a handful of especially diligent “readers” of form contracts can place adequate market pressure on sellers to ensure efficient terms. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 690–92. The theory is that where sellers
cannot easily distinguish between “readers” and “non-readers,” they must draft their terms to satisfy the readers. Gillette, supra, at 691–92 (“Sellers who are unable or fail to differentiate among
reading and nonreading buyers, and who participate in relatively competitive industries where
capturing the marginal buyer increases profitability, will offer the same terms to all buyers that
they offer to reading buyers.”). In the employment context, readers will likely be easier to identify
(and may even self-identify), but because of employers’ strong desire for uniform policies they are
likely to make any adjustment in terms universal.
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small groups of employees working in non-union environments. Widespread access to personal electronic devices and the use of social media
platforms has enabled workers to swiftly voice job-related complaints and
concerns and connect with friends and co-workers. 309 Such activity can
meet the definition of protected concerted activity under the National Labor
Relations Act. 310 In a number of widely noted decisions, the National Labor
Relations Board has protected employee social media posts and comments
from employer retaliation, 311 and a series of memoranda from the Board’s
General Counsel suggests that the agency is willing to pursue unfair labor
practice charges in such situations. 312
Whether employees are able to leverage such channels effectively and
achieve more favorable terms of employment remains to be seen, but anecdotal evidence of successful consumer campaigns offers reason for optimism. In one example, a group of aggrieved consumers convinced General
Mills, the stalwart cereal company, to retract its arbitration policy. 313 Expressions of dissatisfaction with the policy began on Facebook and Twitter,
gathered momentum in the blogosphere, and ultimately culminated in a
public apology by the company. 314 In the employment context, reasonable
309
See generally Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers:
Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2007) (discussing the importance of employee blogs and their need for greater legal protection).
310
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) grants employees “the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
311
See, e.g., Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (Mar. 31, 2015) (finding employee’s Facebook post criticizing superior and encouraging unionization protected as concerted activity);
Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014) (finding employees’ Facebook posts discussing superior’s bookkeeping errors protected as concerted activity); Hispanics United of Buffalo,
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. (Dec. 14, 2012) (finding employees’ Facebook posts discussing co-worker
protected as concerted activity); see also James Long, Note, #Fired: The National Labor Relations
Act and Employee Outbursts in the Age of Social Media, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1217, 1219–20 (2015)
(discussing application of NLRA’s protection of concerted activity to employees’ use of social
media).
312
See generally DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) (summarizing recent NLRB decisions concerning
social media); DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) (same); DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN.
COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) (same).
313
Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/general-mills-reverses-itself-onconsumers-right-to-sue.html [http://perma.cc/Y93B-2LVX] (reporting on company’s decision to
revise its website terms in response to public concern).
314
Ricardo Lopez, General Mills Abandons Mandatory Arbitration After Consumer Outcry,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-general-mills-legal-policy-
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notice can ideally enable similar, if less dramatic, conduct. Given a window
of time in which to evaluate and discuss proposed changes of employment,
employees may be more capable of making common decisions for purposes
of influencing employer policy.
In situations where employees can neither influence employer policy
nor go elsewhere, reasonable notice still serves the purpose of giving employees time to prepare for the modification. The advance notice period acts
as a window in which employees can rely on their prior rights in ways that
anticipate their imminent loss. For instance, commission-based employees
faced with a change in compensation structure might direct their energy
toward closing particular deals prior to the change. Rank-and-file wage
earners faced with a prospective pay cut might save more from their remaining checks at current rates of pay. Long-term employees faced with a
loss of seniority protection might endeavor to improve performance. Employees anticipating an arbitration agreement, or an adverse change to an
existing arbitration policy, can initiate their claims prior to its adoption. Any
number of responses is possible, depending on the situation of the employee
and the nature of the modification.
Finally, it is possible that a reasonable notice requirement may positively influence firm behavior. Whether because of the administrative burdens of notice or the prospect of some adverse response, a reasonable notice
rule might discourage employers from implementing some subset of changes or at least make them more deliberative in doing so. At best, a reasonable
notice rule can engender better management practices, tempering unilateral

reversal-20140421-story.html [https://perma.cc/7NDK-BAW2] (reporting on company’s blog post
apology). For other examples of successful Internet-based consumer campaigns, see, e.g., M. Alex
Johnson, PayPal Backs down on Controversial New Robocall Policy, NBC NEWS (June 29, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/paypal-backs-down-controversial-new-robocall-policy-n
384116 [http://perma.cc/34GX-CVYT] (reporting how consumer outrage over new PayPal policy
led company to rescind policy); Farhad Manjoo, Tweeting Avengers, SLATE (Sept. 1, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/09/tweeting_avengers.single.html [http
://perma.cc/3CDK-TJ8M] (discussing success of online consumer campaigns involving Comcast
and Maytag); Graeme McMillan, Random House Rescinds Controversial E-Book Contract After
Online Outrage, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/scalzi-e-book-authors/
[http://perma.cc/2XZT-XSLB] (reporting how consumer outrage about new publishing contracts
led publishing company to change contracts); Craig Timberg, Instagram, Facebook Stir Online
Protests for Privacy Policy Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/instagram-facebook-stirs-online-protests-for-privacy-po
licy-change/2012/12/18/6c105d92-4948-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html [http://perma.cc/8Q
KY-8QCZ] (reporting how consumer outrage about new Instagram privacy policy led to company’s apology and policy clarification).
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action and incenting greater discussion between companies and their workforce about fair terms of employment. 315
B. Defining Reasonableness
Whereas employee advocates are likely to argue that a reasonable notice rule does not go far enough in restricting mid-term modifications, employers are likely to complain that the rule is administratively burdensome
and interferes with managerial flexibility. Under a unilateral modification
plus notice rule, employers will be unable to effectuate changes as expeditiously as their business interests would otherwise dictate. They are also
likely to have particular concerns about the use of a reasonableness standard
to define the requisite notice period. Employers have a legitimate need to
know how much notice to provide and in what form in order to ensure that
their policy changes are effective. 316 A reasonableness standard leaves employers vulnerable to litigation over whether the notice provided by the employer for a particular modification was sufficient. 317
Such concerns can be mitigated through judicial elaboration on the nature and purpose of a reasonable notice rule and by identifying an outer limit
on the requisite notice period. Unfortunately, such guidance has been slow
coming in the handbook context despite several courts’ adoption of a unilateral modification plus notice approach. 318 Few reported decisions apply the
rule or engage the reasonableness question. Those that have offer limited and
questionable analysis. Several courts have equated reasonable notice with
actual notice, asking merely whether the change in policy was communicated
315

See, e.g., Langager v. Crazy Creek Prods., Inc., 954 P.2d 1169 (Mont. 1998) (describing
how employer distributed new handbook to its employees,then held a follow up meeting at which
employees could discuss the contents after reviewing them).
316
See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1518–21 (discussing uncertainty that results from courts’
varying approaches to handbook modifications). Similar concerns have been cited as reasons to
reject the formal modification rule. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1161 (Ariz.
1999) (en banc) (Martone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that such a
rule “will create havoc with employer-employee relations,” as “[n]o employer will ever issue one
for fear of endless obligation”); Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1987)
(warning that under such a rule “the employer could find itself obligated in a variety of different
ways to any number of different employees, depending on the modifications which had been
adopted and the extent of the work force turnover”).
317
See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1534 (“[T]he vagueness among courts following this approach over what constitutes ‘reasonable’ notice does little to resolve the confusion over handbook jurisprudence and may at times offer scant protection to abused workers.”).
318
See, e.g., Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263 (Idaho 2012); Bankey, 443 N.W.2d 112; Fleming v. Borden, Inc.,
450 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 1994); Gaglidari v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991); Hogue
v. Cecil I. Walker Mach. Co., 431 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1993); Quijano v. Atkins-Kroll, Inc., 2008
Guam 14 (Guam 2008). See generally supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text (discussing
unilateral modification plus notice approach to handbooks).
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to the employee. 319 This approach ensures that employees are aware of the
employer’s changes, but does not give workers time to evaluate and respond
to the new terms. To be sure, those jurisdictions that have adopted unilateral
modification plus notice have not explicitly embraced this justification for the
rule. But the mere fact of an employee’s awareness that he or she is entering
into a modification is already a fundamental component of contractual assent. 320 Courts have required employers to demonstrate actual notice of the
disputed terms irrespective of their approach to modification.321 It would appear that courts permitting unilateral modification only upon reasonable notice have something more in mind. 322
The more sensible reading is that reasonable notice requires some nonnegligible interval of time between notice and implementation. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken this view in applying Asmus v. Pacific Bell, the 2000 California Supreme Court decision that adopted California’s handbook modification rule. 323 In Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., a
2014 decision from the Ninth Circuit, the employer sought to avoid the
plaintiff’s class action lawsuit alleging various wage and hour violations
based on a modification to its arbitration policy that precluded class-based
suits and required employees to arbitrate all claims individually. 324 The em319
See, e.g., Fleming, 450 S.E.2d 589; Govier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998); see also Yoder, supra note 105, at 1534 (noting court’s conflation of reasonable notice with actual notice). As previously discussed, the Restatement of Employment Law has endorsed this view. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); supra notes
104–133 and accompanying text.
320
See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:16 (4th ed. 2015) (“As a general
principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree knows of its existence.”).
321
A number of cases have struck down arbitration policies where, due to the employer’s
method of dissemination, the employee likely had not noticed the change. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555–59 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that an e-mail
announcing a new arbitration policy requiring no affirmative response did not give the employee
sufficient notice); Hudyka v. Sunoco, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716–17 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding
that an e-mail announcing a new arbitration policy not marked as important or affecting employees’ rights and using optional language did not provide sufficient notice); Skirchak v. Dynamics
Research Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D. Mass. 2006) (same); Archer v. Fujitsu Network
Commc’ns, 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36–37 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding the posting of an arbitration policy on the employer’s website with no evidence of access by the employee to be insufficient notice).
322
Indeed, the California Supreme Court in Asmus v. Pacific Bell seems to suggest not only
that a mid-term handbook modification requires reasonable advance notice, but that the original
policy must endure for a reasonable period of time. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73 (“An employer may
unilaterally terminate a policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of indefinite duration, and the employer effects the change after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice,
and without interfering with the employees’ vested benefits.” (emphasis added)).
323
Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding employer
provided reasonable notice of handbook modification as required by Asmus); Asmus, 999 P.2d at
73.
324
755 F.3d at 1089.

Boston College Law Review

492

[Vol. 57:427

ployer’s revisions, which occurred in July and August of 2011, were first
distributed to the employees in June. 325 At that time, the existing arbitration
policy stated that the employer would provide thirty days’ notice of any
changes to the policy. 326 The court held that the employer had complied
with its own notice provision and California’s reasonable notice rule. 327
In so holding, however, the court rejected the employee’s argument
that the notice she received was inadequate because it did not explicitly
state that the changes would be effective in thirty days. 328 An interpretation
more consistent with the goal of granting employees time to prepare for or
respond to proposed changes would require the employer to make clear that
the changes will only be implemented as of a specified future date. A notice
that could lead the employee to think the changes are immediately effective
does not achieve the purpose of the rule. Indeed, the Davis court seemed to
recognize the weaknesses of the notice provided in that case, acknowledging that the employer’s communication with its employees was not “the
model of clarity.” 329 It allowed the modification, however, noting that the
employer did not seek to enforce the modification against the employee
within the thirty-day period. 330 The fact that the original policy itself informed employees that thirty days’ notice would be required for subsequent
modifications presumably also influenced this result.
At a minimum, Davis stands for the proposition that there must at least
be a period of time between notice and implementation and thirty days satisfies that time. A better view, and a safer interpretation for employers seeking to ensure enforceability, is that employers must explicitly identify the
effective date in the notice communicating the change. This still leaves open
the question of how much notice is required. Davis was an easy case inasmuch as the employer had already specified an intuitively reasonable notice
period of thirty days. 331 Had the policy not contained such a provision, or
designated a significantly shorter period, the court would have had to confront the question outright. 332 Cases adopting and applying a unilateral
modification plus notice rule thus far have neither articulated a bright-line
325

Id. at 1091–92.
Id. The employer eliminated this obligatory notice requirement as part of its revisions. Id.
at 1092 n.3.
327
Id. at 1094.
328
Id. at 1093.
329
Id. at 1094. Further confusing the matter was the fact that the cover letter to the modifications referred to the enclosed document as the “current version.” Id. at 1093.
330
Id. at 1094.
331
See id.
332
The court would also have had to address the degree to which employers can eliminate or
define the notice period by contract, a subject to which this Article returns infra notes 346–371
and accompanying text.
326
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rule with respect to reasonableness, nor elaborated meaningfully on how
reasonableness should be determined. Moreover, the amount of notice provided as a factual matter in such cases ranges significantly. On one end,
courts have upheld modifications implemented immediately; 333 at the other
end is Asmus, which upheld a modification where employees received six
months’ advance notice of the change. 334
Further refinement of the reasonableness standard ought to reflect the
underlying purpose of the rule, which in turn requires one to consider the
substance of the modification itself. As discussed previously, not every
modification is likely to spur employees to seek alternate employment.
Some might lead to negotiation; some might simply induce employee protest. At least one commentator has suggested a tiered approach to handbook
modifications under which employees receive varying degrees of notice
depending on whether the change is “procedural” or “substantive.” 335 Under
this approach, employees would receive three months’ advance notice for
“substantive” modifications, such as changes in compensation structure,
down to as little as one week for procedural modifications, such as changes
to disciplinary procedures. 336
Drawing distinctions based on which rights are substantive and which
are procedural is a fraught business. 337 Nevertheless, the idea of linking the
amount of notice to the significance of the change makes sense. Under such
an approach, one would require the greatest amount of notice for noncompetes. As previously noted, such agreements not only eliminate a critical
baseline right, they also limit the employee’s ability to leave subsequent to
the modification. 338 Changes to job security and compensation terms would
be next in significance. Arbitration agreements and amendments to existing
333

See Govier, 957 P.2d at 813.
See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73.
335
See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1540.
336
Id. at 1540–42.
337
See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1999) (observing that “procedure
and substance [are] ‘inextricably intertwined,’ that ostensibly procedural rules sometimes involve[] policy choices, and that such choices ha[ve] important substantive effects” (quoting Dan
Byron Dobbs, Comment, Judicial Regulation of Procedure, 9 ARK. L. REV. 146, 152–55 (1955)));
Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,
336 (1933) (“In the case of the alleged distinction between ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural law’,
. . . for some purposes the basis for any such classification disappears entirely and all can be treated or regarded as ‘substantive.’”); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325 (1986) (“Ultimately, procedure and substance cannot be
divorced: no procedural decision can be completely ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not affect
substance.”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 801, 802 (2010) (“Procedure is an instrument of power that can, in a very practical sense,
generate or undermine substantive rights.”).
338
See supra notes 300–315 and accompanying text.
334
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arbitration policies might be equally significant, depending on their content.
Least significant would be adjustments in paid time off, disciplinary procedures, or other administrative policies, where the purpose of notice is merely to allow employees to oppose or prepare for the change rather than seek
alternate employment. 339 The amount of notice considered reasonable
should also include considerations beyond just the significance of the modification to the employee. The reason behind the employers’ change in policy and any circumstances requiring prompt adoption might justify a shorter
notice period than what would otherwise be expected.
Returning to the amount of notice, the proposal to cap notice at three
months has some administrative, as well as intuitive, appeal. 340 A somewhat
shorter amount may be more appropriate, however, in recognition of the
fact that many employers will incline toward providing the maximum
amount of notice as a matter of course for any change of significance in
order to ensure enforceability. Recent legislative developments favoring
advance notice in particular contexts suggest that two months may be a
good benchmark. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
requires employers to provide sixty days’ advance notice of any material
modification to health care plans that occur during the plan year. 341 In the
consumer protection arena, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”) requires credit card issuers to
provide card-holders forty-five days’ advance notice of annual percentage
rate increases, as well as other significant terms such as fees and finance
charges. 342 As in the employment context, the purpose of requiring advance
notice in the credit card context is to give consumers time to adjust to the
proposed change—whether by finding other sources of credit, paying off
their balance, or simply developing a workable payment plan. 343
339

Mid-term modifications to qualified plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would obviously be governed by those
laws.
340
See Yoder, supra note 105, at 154 (setting a three-month period because it corresponds to
one fiscal quarter).
341
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15(d)(4) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2012) (“A summary of any
material modification . . . shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant.”).
342
15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(1)–(2) (2012); see Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can
Do What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1128
(2010) (discussing adoption and effect of the CARD Act); Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty
Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2010) (same). Along with the notice, the issuer must inform
the consumer of the ability to terminate the card before the effective date. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(3).
343
See David Smith, The Credit CARD Act of 2009, 47 HOUS. LAW. 28, 29 (2010) (“This
[notice] provision is in response to the perception that companies ‘hooked’ customers on the credit
card and then raised the rate without sufficient notice to allow the debtor to either pay off or move
the balance.”).
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On the other side of the spectrum, at least two-weeks’ notice seems
appropriate for changes of modest impact. Two weeks is the amount of time
employers typically expect employees to provide in advance of a voluntary
termination. 344 This is considered a matter of courtesy, if not of contract,
allowing the employer to prepare for the loss of the employee. It therefore
makes sense to require two weeks as the minimum notice period for midterm modifications of limited impact. Because the goal of notice in that
context is to allow the employee a measure of advance warning to prepare
or respond, it is not necessary for the employee to have enough time to conduct a job search. Nevertheless, anything less than two weeks’ notice is
likely to be insufficient for even these more limited purposes.
In sum, it is likely to be challenging for courts to define and for employers to predict how much notice is reasonable, at least upon initial adoption of a reasonable notice standard. Courts and commentators have already
begun that process, however, and legislative efforts provide a baseline for
comparison. Whatever the benchmark, employers will have an incentive to
identify a “highest common denominator” for what suffices as reasonable
notice for particular types of modifications. 345 Such efforts, combined with
case law developments, should ultimately lead to a set of best practices on
which employers can rely in managing their workforce.
C. Reasonable Notice and Employer-Drafted Change-of-Terms Provisions
The prospect of employer compliance efforts, however, is a doubleedged sword. Some employers may develop a useful protocol regarding the
appropriate amount of notice to provide for particular mid-term modifications. Others, however, may attempt to contract out of the obligation altogether by stating in their policies that the employer reserves the right to
change terms without notice. 346

344
See Jessica A. Magaldi & Olha Kolisnyk, The Unpaid Internship: A Stepping Stone to a
Successful Career or the Stumbling Block of an Illegal Enterprise? Finding the Right Balance
Between Worker Autonomy and Worker Protection, 14 NEV. L.J. 184, 185 (2013).
345
See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 46 (using this term to describe management-side compliance practices that aim to avoid uncertainty and liability risk through overcompliance).
346
Many employers already include clauses purporting to reserve the right to change terms
without notice in their employment manuals along with standard language disclaiming the manual’s contractual significance. See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d
89, 95 (Conn. 1995) (“[P]ublication is distributed for general informational purposes only, and as
such is subject to change without notice.”); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 268,
270 (Mich. 1991) (“[T]hese conditions can be changed by the Company, without notice, at any
time.”); In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010) (“The Boot Jack reserves the right to revoke,
change or supplement guidelines at any time without notice . . . .”).
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The effectiveness of these “change-of-terms” clauses is unclear under
current doctrine. 347 There appears to be no reported decision in which a
court has directly addressed whether an employer-drafted provision providing for no notice, or extremely limited notice, trumps an established reasonable notice rule. What is clear is that the insertion of a change-of-terms
clause, whether or not it explicitly disclaims the obligation to provide notice, reduces the likelihood that the original policy will be deemed contractual. 348 This gives employers a strong incentive to include change-of-terms
clauses in their handbooks, in order to reduce the overall risk of implied
contract liability. This in turn moots the modification question. If the original policy was never binding, there are no legal constraints on the employer’s ability to modify it, regardless of what the policy itself says on the matter. 349
347

The phrase “change-of-terms” provision, which this Article adopts, comes from the consumer service contract arena where clauses purporting to allow providers to unilaterally change
the terms of a consumer service plan are both commonplace and commonly litigated. See infra
notes 348–371 and accompanying text.
348
Numerous cases have held that an employer-drafted disclaimer of the contractual significance of its employee handbook, irrespective of its modification terms, justifies an award of summary judgment. See, e.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987);
Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 792 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
349
It bears noting that scholars have widely criticized judicial deference to boilerplate disclaimers. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 127, at 369–70 (describing such decisions as letting employers have their “cake and eat it too”); Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of Implied
Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 387 (2008) (arguing that the reasonable expectations of the employee should prevail “regardless of disclaimers to the contrary in handbooks”); Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract
Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 733, 750 (calling judicial deference to boilerplate disclaimers as coming
close to “deference to a fraud”); Clyde W. Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers, the Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1106–07 (1984) (calling for close scrutiny of overreaching provisions in contracts of employment including disclaimer clauses). Indeed, there are various
reasons why an employee might expect an employer to abide by its manual regardless of such
language. See, e.g., Connor v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E.2d 606, 611–12 (S.C. 2002) (finding
the combination of promissory language and boilerplate disclaimers sufficiently confusing to
create a question of fact as to whether the employee could reasonably believe the employer was
bound by its disciplinary procedure and termination standards despite disclaimer language); Baril
v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctr., 573 S.E.2d 830, 836, 838 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of employer where handbook with disclaimer included mandatory language and
assurances that the procedures would be followed); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 105, 139 (1997) (finding that 74% of survey respondents incorrectly believed
that employers could not fire an at-will employee for purely cost-saving reasons even when shown
a typical employment at will disclaimer); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them:
Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just
Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 335 (2002) (finding 50% incorrect response rate in similar study of employee perception of disclaimer language). The effectiveness of
disclaimers in general, however, is outside the scope of this Article. The point, rather, is that given
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In the case of arbitration agreements, incentives cut the other way.
Employers want these agreements to bind their employees and are thus inclined to contractually constrain their ability to modify rather than the reverse. 350 Arbitration agreements that broadly reserve employer modification
rights run the risk of being found illusory or unconscionable irrespective of
when they are presented or whether they are ultimately modified. 351 This
makes it unlikely that employers will attempt to circumvent a reasonable
notice rule through a change-of-terms clause in the arbitration context. They
are far more likely to affirmatively promise advance notice and to specify
how much. The risk is that they will specify too little.
Legal and policy considerations suggest such one-sided, employerdrafted provisions ought not be enforced. The law of contract modification
is, after all, part and parcel with the law of contract formation: a modification is viewed as a new contract. 352 The UCC good faith rule still requires
mutual assent, notwithstanding its rejection of the common law consideration requirement. 353 Such contract formalities comprise a set of first principles for effecting a binding mutual exchange; they are not default rules from
which parties may deviate. Even contracting parties of equal bargaining
existing law, the legal effectiveness of a “no notice”-of-modification provision in allowing employers to immediately modify a binding policy is a question unlikely to reach the courts.
350
For this reason employer arbitration agreements often affirmatively state that advance
notice of changes will be provided. See, e.g., Davis, 755 F.3d at 1092 (noting the employer’s arbitration policy required thirty days’ advance notice for changes.); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276
F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (same); Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245
F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 (E.D. Okla. 2003) (noting the employer’s arbitration policy required ten
days’ advance notice for changes).
351
See, e.g., Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that a disclaimer giving the employer a unilateral right to modify an arbitration clause was illusory
and unenforceable); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the employer’s ability to unilaterally modify the arbitration agreement rendered it substantively unconscionable); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14–15 (D. Maine 2001)
(holding that a disclaimer giving the employer a unilateral right to modify an arbitration clause
was illusory and unenforceable); cf. Serpa v. Cal. Surety Investigations, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d
506, 516 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prevented the employer from unilaterally modifying the arbitration agreement, and therefore the
agreement was neither illusory nor unconscionable).
352
See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text. See generally 3 LORD, supra note 320,
§ 7:37 (describing in part the traditional common law approach to modification requiring new
consideration to overcome the pre-existing duty rule).
353
See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAW 2015) (“This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present
hamper such adjustments.”); 2A DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209:23 (3d ed. 2015) (“U.C.C. § 2-209 eliminates only the contract formation requirement of consideration. In order to establish a modification, it must be shown that
there was an agreement to modify the original contract. Mutual assent is required to establish the
existence of a modification of the sales contract.” (footnote omitted)).
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power operating at arm’s length cannot bind themselves to a deal that gives
one side absolute discretion to change the terms of exchange after the fact.
It is for this reason that courts generally imply modest limitations on party
discretion—most often an obligation to exercise due diligence or good
faith. 354 In some situations, courts imply a duty to provide reasonable notice, 355 usually when the parties intend to be bound despite the illusory nature of their promises. Case law refusing to enforce arbitration policies that
grant employers unlimited discretion to modify their terms is consistent
with these principles. 356
Thus, basic principles of mutuality and exchange supply cogent reasons why a change-of-terms clause providing for no advance notice should
be void. A change-of-terms clause that merely limits the amount of notice,
however, presents a closer question. A formalistic view would suggest that
such clauses are enforceable. An employer’s promise to provide even negligible notice arguably supplies the requisite peppercorn of consideration
necessary to make the modification and the surrounding agreement binding.
But the ability of a stronger party to cite a trivial amount of consideration to
support a coercive modification was a key factor in the judicial and legislative retreat away from consideration in favor of a good faith standard. 357
Allowing employers to effect an ex ante agreement permitting them to impose their desired terms without granting the employee reasonable time to
consider the changes would be anathema to this move.
Further analysis of change-of-terms clauses is informed by statutory
and common-law treatment of long-term consumer service agreements.
Consumer credit agreements, Internet service and mobile phone plans, fre354
The classic example is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, in which then-Judge Cardozo
held that a contract for an exclusive marketing license implicitly obligated the licensee to use best
efforts to market the licensor’s products. 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917); see also Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 926 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding in a movie development contract, which granted studio absolute discretion whether to pay plaintiff or develop her movie proposals, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing precluded categorical rejection of plaintiff’s
proposals and required studio to honestly evaluate them consistent with subjective standards of
artistic quality); Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 200 S.E.2d 410, 412, 416 (N.C. App. 1973) (holding that
a real estate contract contingent on buyers’ ability to obtain financing was not illusory because the
contract contained an implied promise that buyers would exercise good faith and reasonable efforts to secure commercially reasonable financing); 2-5 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 5.28 (discussing
courts’ implication of various good faith limitations on discretion in order to render an otherwise
illusory promise enforceable).
355
See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 644–45 (2d Cir.
1945) (holding that an agreement containing no delivery specifications and permitting cancellation
at any time implicitly required performance absent reasonable advance notice of cancellation).
The author discusses the idea of reasonable notice as judicially-implied consideration at greater
length in Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563–68.
356
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
357
See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
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quent flier programs, and a variety of other indefinite service agreements
often contain change-of-terms clauses that, like those contained in employee handbooks, purport to allow the provider to unilaterally modify the terms
of the plan with or without notice. 358 Like employment, these contracts are
terminable at will and consist largely of adhesive terms drafted by the party
with greater bargaining power. 359 Courts addressing the enforceability of
change-of-terms clauses in this context have reached different results depending on the facts presented and the particular legal theory applied. 360
Several have invoked themes similar to those advanced above in support of
non-enforcement in the employment area. For instance, a number of courts
have narrowly interpreted change-of-terms clauses, in an attempt to limit
the scope of the provider’s discretion. Thus, Badie v. Bank of America, a
1998 California Court of Appeal decision, found that a bank’s initiating
agreement, allowing it to change or terminate any terms of the credit card358
A modest body of case law and several scholarly articles consider the enforceability of
such clauses in the consumer context. See, e.g., Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826,
836 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (enforcing an arbitration clause introduced via amendment to a credit
agreement containing a change-of-terms clause where the issuer gave one month’s advance warning and the option to reject the arbitration clause by written notice); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 273, 290–91 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding an alternative dispute resolution provision added
via a change-of-terms clause unenforceable where original agreement contained no dispute resolution terms); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a
unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement unconscionable despite language in consumer’s original cell phone contract permitting modifications on ten days’ notice); DirecTV, Inc. v. Mattingly,
829 A.2d 626, 634–635 (Md. 2003) (holding the addition of an arbitration clause in a television
subscription contract introduced via a change-of-terms provision unenforceable because no explanatory correspondence of the change was provided with the modified contract); KortumManaghan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 700–01 (Mont. 2009) (determining that “bill stuffer” arbitration agreement imposed pursuant to a credit card change-of-terms clause was unenforceable because consumer did not receive sufficient notice of the change); Alces & Greenfield,
supra note 342, at 1130–45 (arguing that change-of-terms clauses should not be enforced beyond
the reasonable expectations of the consumer because they are unconscionable and contrary to the
duty of good faith); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 3 (recommending the use of Change
Approval Boards to police unilateral modifications in consumer contracts); Horton, supra note
294, at 665 (arguing that change-of-terms provisions should not be enforced insofar as they permit
unilateral substitution of provider’s preferred terms over market-approved terms); Eric Andrew
Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of
Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75, 111–12 (2006) (arguing that change-of-terms clauses in
contracts should be either enforceable or severely limited under the doctrines of reasonable expectations, unconscionability, and good faith and fair dealing); Daniel Watkins, Terms Subject to
Change: Assent and Unconscionability in Contracts That Contemplate Amendment, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2009) (arguing that change-of-terms clauses should only be enforced with
“heightened” notice and assent).
359
See Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 43–45 (drawing an analogy between consumerservice provider and employer-employee relationships).
360
The wide variety of contract principles that have been invoked in such analyses includes
assent, contract interpretation, good faith, and unconscionability. See Horton, supra note 294, at
623–29 (discussing various judicial approaches to change-of-terms cases).
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holders’ accounts at any time, did not contemplate the introduction of an
arbitration policy where the original agreement contained no dispute resolution terms. 361 The court justified its analysis in part by reference to the implied duty of good faith, concluding that a provider does not act in an objectively reasonable manner consistent with that duty when it seeks to add an
entirely new term not within the contemplation of the parties at contract
formation. 362 To conclude otherwise, said the court, would open the door to
the claim that the original agreements were illusory. 363
Courts assessing consumer change-of-terms clauses have also been influenced by the degree to which the drafter’s modification process allows
consumers to opt out of the change. Thus, several decisions have enforced
unilateral changes where the issuer or service provider gave the consumer
advance warning of the new terms and the opportunity to reject them. 364
Such decisions are consistent with the idea previously advanced with respect to employer change-of-terms provisions—that although employers
361

Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277–78. The agreements went on to state that the bank would
provide notice in advance “to the extent required by law,” presumably referring to state statutory
law. Id. Several states have laws requiring lenders to provide advance notice of changes in account
terms. See Horton, supra note 294, at 625 n.131 (citing ALA. CODE § 5-20-5 (1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.995(4) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-54(c) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3205(1) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-204(2)(3)(b) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 3-204(2) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 97A.140(4) (LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-14-02 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1109.20(D) (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-11(a) (Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 54-11-10 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1907(a) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4102(2)(b) (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63(D) (Supp. 2009) (cataloguing state statutes
that require notice)). Federal law now requires advance notice for all credit card accounts. See 15
U.S.C. § 1637; supra note 342 and accompanying text (discussing the CARD Act). The implication of the change-of-terms provision, however, is that advance notice is not required under the
contract.
362
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284–85; see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d
424, 431 (N.C. App. Ct. 2004) (concluding, in applying Arizona law, that an issuer’s ability to
unilaterally modify through a change-of-terms provision is “not consistent with good faith and is
not within the reasonable expectations of cardholders”). But see Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 899–900 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (rejecting the notion in Badie that the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing precludes addition of an arbitration provision).
363
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284–85; see also Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341
F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting in refusing to allow bank to add arbitration clause
to consumer credit agreement that “[t]o hold otherwise would permit the Bank to add terms . . .
without limitation as to [their] substance or nature”); Avery, 593 S.E.2d at 432 (concluding that the
“power to unilaterally amend contractual provisions without limitation gives rise to an illusory
contract”).
364
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 683–684, 691 (S.D. Miss. 2001)
(enforcing an arbitration clause introduced via amendment to a credit agreement containing a
change-of-terms clause where the issuer gave one month’s advance warning and the option to
reject the arbitration clause by written notice); Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 826, 836 (same); Stiles
v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1412–14, 1418 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (same, where
consumer received two months’ advance warning).
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have the right to alter terms of employment unilaterally, they cannot contract away the obligation to provide at least reasonable advance notice of
their desired change. 365 In other words, drafting parties cannot retain both
unlimited substantive discretion and unlimited procedural discretion. At a
minimum, advance notice must be provided.
Lawmakers appear to share this view. Although the case law on consumer change-of-terms clauses remains in conflict, legislation on credit card
plans now precludes unilateral changes of key terms absent advance notice.
The federal CARD Act requires credit card issuers to provide forty-five
days’ advance notice of significant changes of terms, such as increases in
annual percentage rate, fees, and finance charges. 366 Various state laws similarly require advance notice by issuers of revolving credit plans. 367 Commentators too have spoken uniformly in condemning consumer change-ofterms clauses. Their concerns have been framed largely in economic terms
and have not specifically singled out the problem of waivers of advance
notice. 368 Nevertheless, making advance notice mandatory can help reduce
some of the economic inefficiencies that change-of-terms clause are likely
to occasion. When consumers, as well as employees, have advance notice,
they have a greater ability and incentive to compare proposed terms with
those of other providers or employers, reducing the likelihood that drafters
will be able to insist on overreaching terms.
To be sure, the law in the consumer arena is not completely supportive
of the argument advanced here. At least some case law could support the
conclusion that an issuer or provider might be able to unilaterally change
terms without any notice if that power is expressly reserved. 369 Nor is the
consumer context wholly analogous to employment. Yet, the differences
between the two contexts suggest that employer change-of-terms provisions
should be subject to even greater scrutiny than those found in consumer
agreements. Although changes to consumer agreements can create unfair
365

See supra notes 263–295 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(1)–(2); see Alces & Greenfield, supra note 342, at 1128 (noting
CARD Act’s affect on the law of unilateral modifications); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at
5–6 (same). As part of the required notice, the issuer must notify the consumer of the ability to
terminate the card before the effective date. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(3).
367
See Horton, supra note 294, at 625 n.131.
368
See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 6 (“[S]ellers’ unchecked power to modify
contracts prevents the efficient operation of markets for consumer products. Comparison shopping
becomes meaningless when the product or contract can be changed easily soon after the purchase
is complete.”); Horton, supra note 294, at 609 (arguing that unilateral revisions are inefficient
because “no rational adherent would spend the time and energy necessary to shop for terms that
the drafter can freely change”).
369
See Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
(holding an arbitration agreement added to a deposit account agreement via a change-of-terms
clause enforceable where no advance notice was given).
366
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surprise and have economic consequences, they affect a discrete area of a
consumer’s finances and their impact can be limited by diversification. Creditworthy consumers can hold multiple credit cards, hedging the possibility
that one issuer might alter its terms unfavorably. In many cases, consumers
are also capable of finding replacement providers with minimal transaction
costs. 370 By contrast, employees hold only one full-time job at a time, which
often comprises their sole source of income. Changes in terms affect their
entire livelihood, and the risks of exit in seeking alternate work are enormous. 371
In sum, there are sound reasons to deny enforcement of employer
change-of-term clauses. Even if employers can contractually reserve the right
to modify, they should not be permitted to wholly eliminate the obligation to
provide advance notice or contractually reduce notice to an unreasonable
amount. Legislative and judicial treatment of consumer service agreements
provide further support for this conclusion. Allowing employers to contract
for the right to indiscriminately change terms without conforming to the minimal procedural obligation to provide reasonable notice would do an injustice
to foundational contract principles and undermine the duty of good faith.
D. Promises of Job Security and the Special Case of Employee Handbooks
A final questioned posed by the reasonable notice rule is whether in
some cases mere compliance with a notice requirement, however much the
employer provides, might not be sufficient to effect a binding mid-term
modification. As discussed previously, the unilateral modification approach
currently espoused by courts, whether or not advance notice is considered a
requirement, is premised on the at-will status of the parties’ relationship. 372
It is only because employers are free to terminate workers for any or no rea370

Of course, there may be little use in searching for favorable terms when they can be unilaterally changed. See Horton, supra note 294, at 609 (describing the economic inefficiencies
change-of-terms provisions generate for consumers).
371
The author has elsewhere described the more onerous effect of unilaterally imposed terms
on employees, as compared to consumers, in the context of employer-drafted terms introduced
subsequent to the employee’s acceptance of employment and upon the start of performance. See
Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 980 (asserting that unlike consumers who can
return or reject a product in response to unfavorable terms, employees have very limited ability to
“return” a job after incurring the start up costs of beginning employment); Arnow-Richman,
Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 653 (noting that the obstacles to consumer rejection of
changes in terms “are all the more burdensome in the employment context, where the employee
has already invested financially and emotionally in what he or she expects to be a reliable means
of earning a living”).
372
See, e.g., Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96, 105–06 (Nev. 2008) (“[W]e
recognized that at-will employees have no contractual rights arising from the employment relationship that limit the employer’s ability to prospectively hire and fire employees, and to change
the terms of employment.” (footnote omitted)); supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
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son that they can introduce new terms at their election. It therefore follows
that if an employer has contractually altered the at-will relationship by
granting just cause protection to its workforce, the employer is no longer at
liberty to make unilateral changes.
This reasoning suggests that the unilateral modification plus notice approach may be inapplicable to mid-term modifications of employee handbooks containing job security promises. 373 Absent a legitimate reason to
terminate workers pursuant to the extent policy, the employer would have to
convince its workforce to give up whatever benefit it wished to withdraw. 374
If that benefit is the job security provision itself, one would expect employees to be particularly recalcitrant. From this perspective, the minority jurisdictions favoring the formal modification approach to handbooks appear to
have gotten it right. Indeed, one would not expect an employee to sacrifice
job security absent a return promise of real value.
A complicating consideration, however, is the scope and duration of
the original promise. Most reported decisions assessing the validity of a
mid-term modification of an employee handbook presume that the challenged modification retracts a contractually-binding promise of just-cause
protection. 375 The facts, however, are not always so clear. For instance, in
Demasse v. ITT Corp., the 1999 Arizona Supreme Court decision, the handbook provision at issue required layoffs to be conducted in reverse seniority
order (“last in first out”). 376 The disputed modification replaced this seniority policy with a performance-based layoff procedure. 377 In adopting the
formal modification approach, the court presumed that the original manual
containing the seniority policy “offer[ed] a term of job security,” such that
the plaintiffs’ employment relationship was no longer at will. 378 There is a

373

See Walters, supra note 105, at 410–11.
See id.
375
This owes to the procedural posture of most cases. Reported decisions regarding the effectiveness of a mid-term handbook modification have generally been issued either on certified question or on an employer’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1141
(“The questions certified posit that the layoff seniority provision has become part of the employment contract. Using this assumption, we respond to each question in the negative.” (citation omitted)); Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120–21 (“We emphasize that our answer today is necessarily limited
by the wording of the certified question which asks whether an employer under the circumstances
set forth may unilaterally change from a discharge-for-cause to an employment-at-will policy.”).
376
984 P.2d at 1141 (“The earliest version provided simply that layoffs within each job classification would be made in reverse order of seniority. Later versions also gave more senior employees the ability to ‘bump’ less senior employees.”).
377
Id. (“Four years passed before ITT notified its hourly employees [that] its layoff guidelines
for hourly employees would not be based on seniority but on each employee’s ‘abilities and documentation of performance.’”).
378
Id. at 1143 (“When employment circumstances offer a term of job security to an employee
who might otherwise be dischargeable at will and the employee acts in response to that promise,
374
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difference, however, between a promise that employees will not be terminated—whether for a fixed period of time or absent a particular justification—and a promise that termination, if it occurs, will be conducted pursuant to specified procedures and cushioned by certain benefits. 379 Although
the former might preclude a unilateral modification, the latter arguably
would not.
Even if an employer’s policy explicitly confers job security of the type
presumed in Demasse, there still remains the question how long that policy
is intended to endure. Courts and commentators espousing the unilateral
modification plus notice approach implicitly assume that the original policy
was intended to be of limited duration, whereas those rejecting the approach
assume the policy was to endure indefinitely. But, once again, this question
turns on the facts. In Asmus, for instance, the scope and intent of the original policy was clear. 380 It stated that the employer would “offer all management employees . . . employment security through reassignment . . . and
retraining . . . even if their present jobs are eliminated.” 381 But the policy
also explicitly stated that it would not endure indefinitely. It was to “be
maintained so long as there is no change that would materially affect Pacific
Bell’s business plan achievement.” 382
In Asmus, the court did not determine whether a material change justified Pacific Bell’s retraction of its plan. 383 For purposes of summary judgment, the employer conceded that no such event had occurred, arguing that
it had the right to modify the policy as a matter of law regardless of its intended duration. 384 This was a key point of departure for the dissenting justices, who took the majority to task for treating the employer’s job security
the employment relationship is no longer at will but is instead governed by the terms of the contract.”).
379
See id. at 1154 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the
existence of a contractually binding reverse seniority policy “does not catapult the case beyond the
reach of at-will employment principles”).
380
999 P.2d at 73.
381
Id. The policy was not only explicit but also exceptionally expansive in that it “offer[ed]”
security even in the event of job elimination. See id. A simple just-cause policy would merely
protect employees from arbitrary termination, but it would not protect employees in the event of a
legitimate business justification for reducing employment. See generally RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T
LAW § 2.04 (“[A]n employer has a ground for terminating an agreement for an indefinite term of
employment requiring cause for termination when a significant change in the employer’s economic circumstances means that the employer no longer has a business need for the employee’s services.”).
382
Id. (emphasis omitted).
383
The parties stipulated that Pacific Bell would not present evidence on the issue. Id. at 74.
384
As the dissent put it: “Pacific Bell asserted that it has a right to cancel the MESP unilaterally, notwithstanding the specification of an express condition for rescission of the MESP. . . .
This clause, Pacific Bell contended, did not limit its right to modify unilaterally either the policy
or its duration provision.” Id. at 83–84 (George, C.J., dissenting).
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policy as an indefinite contract with no specified duration. 385 The dissent
would not only have adopted a formal modification approach to mid-term
modifications generally, it would have treated the material change clause of
Pacific Bell’s policy as a condition for retraction and any attempt to modify
the policy in advance of such an event a contractual breach. 386 Considering
the facts from this perspective, even if the majority correctly articulated the
appropriate rule for most run-of-the-mill modifications, Asmus itself may
have been wrongly decided.
In sum, there may be circumstances that justify more aggressive limitation of employer modification rights than the reasonable notice rule advanced in this Article. Where an employer has made a binding, long-term
commitment to ongoing job security for the duration of the employment
relationship, a formal modification rule appears to be correct. But such situations are probably the exception rather than the rule. Few employers are
likely to fully relinquish their termination rights for all time; the question is
whether employees examining their policies could reasonably believe that
they had.387 The upshot is that there can be no categorical rule as to whether
the reasonable notice approach applies to the modification of handbook job
385

Id. at 85 (“Contrary to Pacific Bell’s contention and the majority’s conclusion, the MESP
is a contract for a definite duration. Therefore, Pacific Bell may not terminate the MESP unilaterally before the event defining its duration has occurred.”).
386
Id. (“I would conclude that an employer may not unilaterally modify or rescind an unconditional job security policy, lacking an express duration provision, that has become part of the
employment contract, without providing additional consideration and obtaining the employee’s
assent.”). The dissent further asserted,
To the extent it is unclear how the occurrence of a change materially affecting Pacific Bell’s business plan achievement can be ascertained or measured, we must conclude the condition reasonably may be ascertained by reference to its purpose. Pacific Bell has chosen not to present evidence that the condition occurred . . . . Therefore, Pacific Bell could not terminate the MESP unilaterally without breaching the
contract.
Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
387
See id. at 75 (majority opinion) (“[T]he trier of fact can infer an agreement to limit
grounds for an employee’s termination based on the employee’s reasonable reliance on company
policy manuals.” (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988))); Duldulao v.
Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987) (“[W]e hold that an employee
handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights if . . . [f]irst, the language . . . contain[s] a promise clear enough than an employee would reasonably believe than an
offer has been made.”); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 884
(Mich. 1980) (“[A]n employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an employer’s written policy
statements have been held to give rise to an enforceable contract.”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J.) (“[W]e conclude that when an employer of a substantial
number of employees circulates a manual that, when fairly read, provides that certain benefits are
an incident of the employment . . . the judiciary . . . should construe them in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the employees.” (citations omitted)), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J.
1985).
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security policies. In most cases, employers will have to litigate this issue,
and rightly so, given their decision to disseminate the original policy and
the benefits they doubtlessly derived from it while it was in effect. 388
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for the adoption of a unilateral modification
plus reasonable notice approach as the universal rule for determining the
enforceability of mid-term modifications of at-will employment contracts.
Currently, courts focus on the presence or absence of consideration, an inquiry grounded in outdated rules that ignores the policy considerations underlying mainstream modification law. Parties should have the flexibility to
adjust the terms of their relationship, but the resulting modification should
be the product of agreement, not coercion. At-will employees, faced with
the immediate threat of termination, have no choice but to accept a proposed modification, irrespective of whether they receive a benefit in supposed consideration for the change. Moreover, to the extent any such benefit is contingent on continued employment, it is as illusory as the employment itself.
The better approach, as articulated by courts in the handbook modification context, is to permit unilateral modification only where the employer
provides reasonable advance notice of the change in terms. This rule has
intuitive appeal as a compromise position, but thus far has not been adequately justified as a matter of doctrine or policy. This Article does both,
grounding reasonable notice in the law of good faith modifications and
demonstrating how reasonable notice satisfies the formal requirement of
consideration. In so doing, it presents a meaningful benchmark for determining whether notice is reasonable—the amount of time necessary for an
employee to realistically consider alternate employment. To be sure, reasonable notice will not level the playing field for at-will employees whose
terms of employment remain subject to employer discretion. It will, however, better position them to make use of the limited bargaining power they
have, particularly their right to walk away.

388
Cf. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271 (“All that this opinion requires of an employer is that it be
fair. It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on
those promises.”).

